



The National Centre for Human Rights
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Monitoring Report of the Parliamentary Elections for the Year 2010

Amman – December 2010

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First: Introduction

In 2007, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme and the Canadian International Development Agency, and with the participation of a number of civil society institutions and non-governmental organizations, the National Centre for Human Rights embarked for the first time upon the experience of monitoring the electoral process at its various stages. On that occasion, and by virtue of that experience, the Centre monitored the voter registration process; it likewise formed the National Coalition for Following the Parliamentary Elections, which produced an independent national team comprising two hundred observers under the leadership of the Centre, and monitored the performance of the media during the electoral campaigns, the polling and counting operations, and the objections that followed those elections. In 2008 the Centre issued a comprehensive report containing the most important results of the monitoring exercise, together with a number of recommendations for developing the procedures of the electoral process in a manner ensuring the achievement of fairness among citizens and their right to stand for election and to vote in honest, fair and transparent elections. The Centre also issued a study containing an analysis of the legal framework governing the electoral process and the extent of its consistency with the international standards for honest and fair elections. In February of the same year the Centre organized a workshop to evaluate the performance of the project and the extent to which it had achieved its intended objectives; that workshop produced what may be described as a road map that may be followed in monitoring elections in future years, by identifying the challenges that had confronted the Centre and the mechanisms for addressing them.

In 2009 the Centre implemented the project “Reform of the legal framework governing the electoral process”. The project comprised the holding of a series of meetings in the various governorates of the Kingdom, in which a large number of representatives of civil society institutions, tribal notables and representatives of political parties and of the women’s and youth sectors participated, with the aim of arriving at a national consensus on a set of recommendations for amending the legal framework of the elections and guaranteeing the right to honest and fair elections. At the concluding meeting of this project, held in November 2009, numerous recommendations were adopted which included, among other matters, enabling civil society institutions to monitor the conduct of the electoral process through a participatory approach led by the National Centre for Human Rights.

Pursuant to the Law of the National Centre for Human Rights No. 51 of 2006, and to the experience acquired by the Centre over the past three years, the Centre monitored the entire conduct of the electoral process of 2010, believing in the importance of parliamentary elections as the true expression of the will of the people, and in order to guarantee political pluralism and the rights of the Jordanian citizen to stand for election and to vote freely and fairly, and to broaden the base of political participation through the building and strengthening of confidence in the electoral process. This exercise was facilitated by the earlier approval of His Excellency the Prime Minister for the Centre to “follow and observe” the electoral process, including entry to the polling and counting centres.

The monitoring of the electoral process is one of the tasks entrusted to the National Centre for Human Rights, within the powers conferred upon it under its Law No. (51) of 2006, and in particular Articles 4(c),

5(a) and 10(b) thereof. Moreover, the protection and promotion of human rights is among the most important duties incumbent upon national human rights institutions under the Paris Principles governing their establishment and their work. It goes without saying that the right to vote and to stand for election has been enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as one of the fundamental rights. Since the Jordanian Elections Law confined the persons permitted to be present at polling and counting centres to the members of the polling and counting committee and the delegates of candidates only, the Centre submitted a request for the approval of the Prime Minister for the entry of the members of the National Team for monitoring the elections formed by the Centre to the polling and counting centres during polling day; the Centre obtained this approval by letter of the Prime Minister No. 11035/18/11/1 dated 6/6/2010.

It should be noted that the Centre had, before that, begun preparing to monitor the parliamentary elections after the Royal Will was issued dissolving the Fifteenth House of Representatives on 23/11/2009, and after His Majesty the King issued his orders to the Government to hold the parliamentary elections for the Sixteenth House of Representatives, by his letters of designation to the government of Mr. Nader Al-Dahabi and thereafter to the government of Mr. Samir Al-Rifai, to hold free, honest and transparent elections within one year of the dissolution of the House of Representatives. The Centre accordingly laid down a comprehensive and multifaceted methodology based upon monitoring all stages of the electoral process and documenting its entire conduct, resting upon three principal axes, namely: long-term and short-term field monitoring, in which (1,256) observers representing more than (50) civil society institutions participated; media monitoring through a specialized research team; and the analysis of the complaints received by the Centre concerning the electoral process.

The field monitoring methodology comprised a number of steps, namely:

1. The formation of a team from within the Centre to prepare and supervise all stages of the monitoring exercise.
2. The laying down of a clear and specific work plan.
3. The preparation of the monitoring forms and the requisite training materials, on the basis of the international standards for free and honest elections and the established international practices and principles in this field.
4. The preparation of a code of conduct governing the conduct of all participants in the monitoring exercise.
5. The laying down of a plan for the distribution of observers among the polling centres, having regard to the percentages of the number of ballot boxes in each district and so as to cover all the governorates of the Kingdom.
6. The preparation of communication plans between the observers and the field coordinators at the level of the regions and governorates, and the securing of communication lines and the requisite supplies of equipment and hardware.

7. The training of all observers on the standards for fair and honest elections as set out in the Constitution, the international covenants and best practice, and on the completion of the monitoring forms and their transmission by text message to the Centre.
8. The securing of hotlines to receive complaints from citizens during election day from all the governorates of the Kingdom.
9. The analysis of the monitoring results by computer and manually, and the preparation of statements and reports.
10. The maintenance of communication with the Ministry of the Interior and the Civil Status and Passports Department during the stages of the electoral process, and throughout election day in particular, through liaison officers charged with this task.

All five stages of the electoral process were monitored, namely:

1. The voter registration stage, including appeals.
2. The stage of nomination for membership of the House of Representatives, including appeals.
3. The electoral campaigning stage.
4. The stage of the procedures of election day, including polling, counting and the aggregation of results.
5. The stage of objections to the election results.

Second: Executive Summary

On the basis of the monitoring and observation exercise, the examination of complaints, the following of the positions of the political forces and civil society institutions, and a careful reading of the election results, the National Centre for Human Rights has concluded that most of the procedures governing the electoral process of 2010 were generally consistent with the legal requirements set out in the Elections Law and with the relevant constitutional and international standards, thereby conferring upon the technical aspects of the administration of the electoral process an acceptable character of credibility and transparency by comparison with the elections of 2007, particularly as regards the electronic publication of the voters' rolls, the use of modern technology in the organization and implementation of the electoral process, the permitting of local and international observers to monitor the electoral process, the provision of an appropriate security climate for the arrival of voters at polling centres, and the facilitation of the polling of persons with disabilities. The Centre is nevertheless of the view that the electoral administration committed certain violations that limited this credibility and transparency, the most important of which are:

1. The failure of the electoral administration, of its own motion, to revise and purge the voters' rolls.
2. The delay of the electoral administration in publishing the preliminary and final voters' rolls electronically, and the failure to include in the final voters' rolls all the names of those entitled to vote, in that persons who had been transferred to new electoral districts by decisions issued by the Civil Status and Passports Department and by the competent courts were excluded; most of these persons had not attended the Civil Status Department to obtain a personal civil status card endorsed with the new electoral district.
3. The refusal of the electoral administration to disclose the names of the candidates of the sub-districts promptly.
4. The refusal of the electoral administration to halt and prevent the electoral campaigning of candidates outside the times fixed by the law for such campaigning, including at the polling and counting centres.
5. The failure of the electoral administration to deal firmly with open voting by illiterate voters, open voting generally, and the buying and selling of votes.
6. The lack of readiness of most voter registration centres and polling and counting centres to receive persons with disabilities, the elderly and the sick.
7. The failure of the polling and counting committees to abide by all the instructions issued by the Ministry of the Interior and the manifest disparity in their application, quite apart from the fact that certain technical aspects of the electoral process were not covered by the instructions, which opened the door to discretionary interpretations by the election committees — a matter that gave rise to a state of doubt among the public as to the integrity of the electoral process.
8. The conspicuous presence of security personnel alongside a large number of the election committees throughout the procedures followed on polling day, which is inconsistent with the neutrality presumed of the executive authority supervising the elections.

9. The delay in the arrival of the results of a number of ballot boxes in sensitive and volatile areas at the aggregation centres, and the weakness of transparency in the extraction of polling percentages and in the aggregation of votes from which the vote-aggregation process emerged, in a manner rendering their audit difficult.

The Centre emphasizes a number of negative phenomena that accompanied the electoral process and in respect of which the electoral administration did not take the measures necessary to curb and halt them, the most important of these being the phenomenon of the use of money to purchase votes, which had a manifest adverse effect upon the will of voters and upon the integrity and credibility of the electoral process, and the phenomenon of citizens voting openly and of open voting by illiterate voters in a number of electoral districts without the taking of the measures necessary to put an end to these transgressions — which offended the principle of the secrecy of the ballot enshrined in the Jordanian Constitution and aggravated the problem of the spread of vote-buying.

The Centre is of the view that Provisional Elections Law No. 9 of 2010 achieved some progress by comparison with Provisional Elections Law No. 34 of 2001 and its amendments, particularly as regards the increase in the number of seats allocated to the representation of women; the permitting of civilians working in the armed forces and security agencies to exercise their right to vote so as to broaden the base of popular participation; the strengthening of penalties for electoral offences, and specifically the operation of the selling and buying of votes; the facilitation of the administrative procedures for those wishing to stand for election; the extension of the period for the withdrawal of candidates to seven days instead of three so as to afford voters the opportunity to determine their orientations; and the publication of the names and locations of the polling and counting centres seven days before the date of polling. The Centre records at the same time, however, that this Law contributed to weakening the representation of the political and popular forces and currents in the National Assembly and to limiting the fairness and transparency of the elections, for the following reasons:

1. The inconsistency of the issue of the Law with the spirit of the Jordanian Constitution, which made the ordinary law issued by the legislative authority the general rule, whereas provisional laws are the exception — particularly as it is regarded as one of the fundamental laws governing political life in the State. Nevertheless, and irrespective of the debates that took place concerning its constitutionality and the Centre's settled position as to the necessity that the law be a permanent ordinary law and not a provisional one, it became an operative law not subject to annulment according to prevailing legal convention.
2. The failure of the electoral system adopted by the Law to achieve the principle of representativeness and equality among citizens, particularly as regards the availability of fairness and equality in the division of the electoral districts — quite apart from the fact that this division was effected by regulation and was not incorporated within the Law as had been the case under the previous Elections Law. This system detracted from the principle of equality among voters as a result of the failure to divide the electoral districts into sub-districts on clear bases having regard to the guarantee of relative fairness and equality among them, whether in terms of population, geographical area or developmental dimension.

3. Nor did the Law achieve equality among female candidates in the various electoral areas, in that the comparison between them for the purpose of determining the successful candidates was calculated on the basis of the number of votes obtained by the female candidate divided by the number of voters in the sub-district and not at the level of the governorate, whereas the achievement of fairness and equality among them required that the number of votes obtained by the female candidate be divided by the number of votes of those voting in the governorate, given that the allocation of women's seats was made on the basis of the number of governorates and not on the number of sub-districts.
4. A further aspect of inequality among candidates lay in the failure of the Elections Law to regulate the provisions governing electoral campaigning and to set an upper ceiling for the financing of electoral campaigning and to determine the sources of funding and the manner of its expenditure — which contributed to creating a considerable degree of disparity of opportunity and inequality among candidates.
5. The Law did not provide for entrusting the task of supervising the elections to an independent and permanent national commission headed by a prominent public figure enjoying credibility or by a judicial figure known for complete independence and neutrality; the executive authority was granted under the Elections Law the power of full supervision over the electoral process. Moreover, the limited representation of the judicial authority on the Higher Elections Committee and on the election committees in the governorates does not enable it to perform its role fully in supervising the conduct of the electoral process.
6. The failure of the Law to achieve the principle of competitiveness and transparency in the nomination process, as a result of the adoption of a system of notional sub-districts without any geographical delimitation — which was confirmed by the conduct of the electoral administration, represented by its failure to disclose the names of the candidates of the sub-districts promptly. This is inconsistent with the principle of protecting the competitiveness and transparency of the nomination process, and contradicts the principle of equality among candidates in obtaining equal opportunities of access to parliamentary seats, and the right of the candidate and the voter to obtain information relating to the names of the candidates in the sub-districts — particularly as the form of the sub-districts permits the distribution of parliamentary seats among strong candidates in a manner closer to acclamation than to free and honest competition.
7. The insufficiency of the period afforded to citizens to object to the voters' rolls, namely seven days, given the vast size of the electoral rolls and the names they contain, which limits their right to verify their accuracy and to object to them.
8. The emergence of striking anomalies in the election results, among them the success of a number of deputies in approximately 24.9% of the sub-districts with a number of votes far smaller than the votes obtained by certain candidates who were unsuccessful in other sub-districts of the same (geographical) electoral district. The Law and certain of the practices followed likewise contributed to aggravating the state of societal violence during and after election day in most of the governorates of the Kingdom.

9. The failure of the Law to address many electoral procedures that strengthen integrity and transparency, examples of which are:

- a. The Law did not provide for the organization of voters' registers in each sub-district, which resulted in voters and candidates being unable to inspect the electoral rolls in those districts — which is inconsistent with their right to verify their accuracy and to object to them.
- b. The mechanism adopted by the Law for voting by illiterate voters does not achieve the purpose for which it was laid down, namely the realization of the principle of the secrecy of the ballot; it also involves a degree of complexity.
- c. The Law's omission of a provision requiring the polling committee to record in the record of the commencement of the polling operation the number of papers in the committee's possession.
- d. The Law's omission of the necessity of counting the ballot papers inside the box before beginning to read out the names.
- e. The failure to provide for the necessity that the voters' rolls contain the name, national number, place of registration, identity-issuing office and place of residence, so as to afford citizens the opportunity to challenge at the registration centre situated in the district within which the name of the voter who is the subject of the objection is listed — in furtherance of the principle of transparency and in order to facilitate matters for citizens wishing to inspect the voters' rolls and to object to them.
- f. The failure of the Law to oblige the electoral administration to publish the preliminary and final voters' rolls electronically, while at the same time omitting to oblige the electoral administration to publish the final voters' rolls in paper form.
- g. The failure to provide for the exemption of appeals concerning the voters' rolls from the procedures followed before the courts of first instance, the most important of which is the necessity of instructing a lawyer — a matter that imposes upon citizens financial burdens that may limit their recourse to lodging appeals.
- h. The Law's failure to regulate the mechanism for the submission of complaints and objections to the polling and counting committee, and the necessity that this mechanism be in writing.
- i. The failure to provide for the specifications of the ballot box and the ballot paper.
- j. The failure to regulate the process of the final aggregation of the total votes obtained by candidates in a manner guaranteeing its transparency and integrity.

In conclusion, the Centre takes this opportunity to affirm that democratic elections are regarded as free if they rest upon the rule of a just law, honourable competition, respect for the rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens, and the guarantee of effective judicial remedies at all their stages. Elections are regarded as honest if they are conducted under a fair and effective elections law, if the committees supervising them observe credibility and complete neutrality in their administration and transparency in the registration of voters, the counting of votes and the announcement of the results, and if their results command the acceptance of the majority of voters. In this light, the Board of Trustees of the National Centre for Human Rights has issued this report and recommends as follows:

First

The necessity that the National Assembly discuss the Provisional Elections Law of 2010 as a matter of urgency, and amend and approve it as a permanent law, consistently with the Royal Directives for strengthening the democratic orientation in the Kingdom, contributing to the achievement of political pluralism, and broadening the base of popular participation and the fairness of parliamentary representation, in accordance with the Constitution and the relevant international standards, and in particular Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Second

In order to guarantee the realization of the principle of representativeness and equality among all citizens, it is essential that the Elections Law and the division of districts be amended. The Centre proposes in this regard:

1. Amending the single-vote system and replacing it with a mixed electoral system (one vote for one of the candidates of the small electoral district and another vote for the proportional list at the level of the governorate). This system may be applied gradually so as not to destabilize the gains achieved by groups or categories of Jordanians over past years.
2. Reconsidering the division of the electoral districts on more equitable bases having regard to the guarantee of relative equality among those districts in terms of population, geographical area and developmental dimension, and that the electoral districts be divided by law and not by regulation.
3. Regulating the use of money in the electoral process and laying down the requisite controls in a manner guaranteeing equality among candidates, protecting the will of voters, and guaranteeing the transparency of information relating to the sources of funding, the fixing of its ceilings and the manner of its expenditure; and regulating and halting electoral campaigns and campaigning and removing their manifestations at least twenty-four hours before the time of polling, on pain of criminal liability. Likewise, the cessation of assaults upon public and private property, refraining from interference with guidance boards and traffic signs, and the preservation of public and traffic safety in the course of the use of campaign materials.

Third

In order to guarantee the fair and transparent administration of the electoral process, the Centre emphasizes:

1. The necessity of establishing a supreme, independent and permanent national commission enjoying neutrality and integrity to supervise all stages of the electoral process, headed by a prominent public figure or a judicial figure enjoying independence and neutrality.
2. The importance of including in the Law the appropriate framework for the observation and monitoring of elections by independent national institutions, civil society institutions and credible and professional international institutions.

Fourth

In order to guarantee the proper realization of the principle of universality of voting and nomination, the Centre proposes the introduction of the following amendments to the Law:

1. Fixing the age of the voter such that a person who has completed eighteen solar years of age on the first day of the third month preceding the date fixed for holding the election is entitled to exercise his right to vote.
2. Permitting all Jordanians upon whom a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year for a non-political offence has previously been passed and who have been granted a pardon (general or special) to stand for membership of the House of Representatives, consistently with the text of Article 75(1)(e) of the Constitution.
3. Devising appropriate mechanisms to afford Jordanians residing outside the Kingdom the opportunity to exercise their electoral right.
4. Devising appropriate mechanisms to enable Jordanians detained administratively or judicially to exercise their right to vote, proceeding from the principle that the accused is innocent until proven guilty.
5. Including in the electoral rolls the names of all citizens satisfying the conditions for voting, without being bound by the condition of registration.
6. Subjecting the voters' rolls to annual and periodic revision, and that all information relating to the voter be known correctly and soundly and be organized in a precise manner facilitating recourse to it by any person entitled to vote or having an interest at the material time.
7. Adopting electoral rolls specific to each polling centre so as to ensure that no voter is registered in more than one roll.

Fifth

In order to guarantee the integrity of the electoral process and the polling and counting operations, the Law must include the following:

1. Activating the principle of the secrecy of the ballot by emphasizing the conditions that must be satisfied in the polling booth, and developing the form and content of the ballot paper so that it contains the name of the candidate and his photograph or a clear symbol denoting him for the voter to mark — so as to eliminate the phenomenon of illiterate voting, including the possibility of using the smart civil status card and resorting to electronic voting, while taking the arrangements necessary to guarantee the secrecy of voting for persons with visual impairments.
2. Abolishing the electoral rolls that treat the electoral district as a single unit and replacing them with sub-rolls specific to the voters at each polling centre within the district, or with electoral rolls for the geographically delimited sub-district, and not permitting the voter to vote otherwise than at the centre in which his name is listed in his electoral roll, in order to prevent the possibility of repeated voting.
3. In the field of the transfer of votes, the Centre proposes the following:

- a. Prohibiting the transfer of votes save for those actually resident in the electoral district, including the prohibition of transfer operations during the year preceding the poll, on pain of criminal liability of the voter, the transferor and any person assisting and participating in a transfer operation contrary to the foregoing bases, all of them being regarded as principal offenders.
 - b. That the transfer be effected following a physical field examination and not on the basis of any fictitious documents.
 - c. Subjecting transfer operations to objection before the supreme independent national elections commission by voters, and subjecting decisions determining objections to transfer operations to judicial appeal before the court of first instance situated in the electoral district to which the transfer was made and within whose jurisdiction it falls.
4. Publishing the voters' rolls by electronic publication in addition to other means of publication, and republishing the final rolls after objection to them and consideration of appeals, so as to afford voters and candidates the opportunity to inspect them and verify their accuracy.
 5. Widening the jurisdiction of the courts in considering appeals relating to the voters' rolls, such that the courts have jurisdiction to consider any appeal submitted to them based upon the inaccuracy of the voters' roll, and not restricting their competence to specific cases exhaustively enumerated as set out in Article 5(g) and (h).
 6. Providing expressly in the Law for the exemption of appeals submitted against the voters' rolls from the formal procedures followed before the courts of first instance as regards the instruction of lawyers.
 7. Making the judicial process in relation to appeals concerning nomination one of at least two tiers, so as to guarantee the unification of judicial interpretation in that regard.

Sixth

In order to guarantee the integrity and transparency of the procedures relating to the electoral process on polling day, the Centre recommends the following:

1. Obliging the polling and counting committees to count the ballot papers in their possession before commencing the polling operation and to document that count.
2. Providing for a clear mechanism for the submission of complaints to the polling and counting committees during the polling and counting operations, such that complaints are submitted and determined in writing, and affording the right to challenge the decisions of the committees before the competent courts.
3. Providing the facilities necessary for the participation of persons with disabilities in the polling operation.
4. Providing for a transparent and clear mechanism for the operations of the final aggregation of the votes obtained by candidates and for their announcement.

5. Raising the capacities of the staff charged with administering the electoral process in the proper procedures for applying the provisions of the Elections Law and best practice for free and honest elections.

Third: The legal basis for monitoring the elections and the formation of the National Team

Article 4(c) of the Law of the National Centre for Human Rights No. 51 of 2006 provides that among the objectives of the Centre is: “the promotion of the democratic approach in the Kingdom so as to create an integrated and balanced model founded upon the diffusion of freedoms, the guarantee of political pluralism, respect for the rule of law, and the guarantee of the right to economic, social and cultural development”. Article 5(a) of the Law likewise provides that among the means employed by the Centre to achieve its objectives is: “verification of respect for human rights in the Kingdom, in order to address any transgressions of or violations of those rights, and following up the taking of the measures necessary for this purpose, including their settlement or their referral to the executive or legislative authority or to the competent judicial body in order to halt them and to remove their effects”. Article 7 of the Law provides that: “the Centre shall monitor transgressions occurring against human rights and public freedoms in the Kingdom, and shall seek to halt any transgression thereof”. Pursuant to Article 8, the Centre may “request from the relevant entities any information, data or statistics that it deems necessary for the achievement of its objectives, and those entities shall respond to the request without delay or postponement”. Article 9 provides that “if the violation of human rights is committed by a public official, the Centre may notify the official body to which that official belongs in order that the appropriate legal measures be taken against him”. Finally, Article 10(b) of the Law provides that the Centre has the right to “visit any public place in respect of which a report is received that transgressions of human rights have occurred or are occurring”.

Based upon the foregoing, and since the right of the individual to stand for election and to vote in periodic, honest and fair elections is among the rights enshrined in the Jordanian Constitution and in a number of regional and international covenants and conventions, the monitoring of the conduct of the various stages of the electoral process is one of the tasks entrusted to the Centre under its Law and falls within the powers conferred upon it.

The Elections Law, however, confined the persons permitted to be present at polling and counting centres to the members of the polling and counting committee and the delegates of candidates. Accordingly, the National Centre for Human Rights submitted a request for the approval of the Prime Minister for the entry of the members of the National Team for monitoring the elections attached to the Centre to the polling and counting centres during polling day; the Centre obtained this approval by letter of His Excellency the Prime Minister No. 11035/18/11/1 dated 6/6/2010.¹

Fourth: The methodology used in monitoring the parliamentary elections of 2010

¹ See Annex No. (1), which sets out the content of the letter of His Excellency the Prime Minister referred to.

The Centre laid down a methodology for monitoring the stages of the electoral process, documenting its entire conduct and ascertaining the extent of its integrity and transparency, resting upon three principal axes, namely:

The first axis: field monitoring

The Centre based the implementation of the field monitoring of the electoral process upon the deployment of observers in the various areas of the Kingdom to monitor acts occurring contrary to the law, whether on the part of the electoral administration, the candidates or the voters, with a view to ensuring respect for the principle of the rule of law and compliance with the international standards for free and honest elections. The Centre therefore emphasized the necessity that observers adhere to the standards of credibility, transparency, integrity and neutrality while gathering information concerning the electoral operations, so as to lead to objective reports addressing the conduct of the electoral process without interference in its course. In order to guarantee the speed and integrity of the transmission of information and observations and sound organization and coordination, a hierarchical structure was adopted in the formation of the National Team, whose strength amounted to (1,265) persons representing more than (50) civil society institutions under the leadership of the National Centre for Human Rights. The monitoring team was composed of a project director, a general coordinator, three coordinators for the northern, central and southern governorates, a number of administrative, technical and financial assistants, in addition to a coordinator for each of the governorates of the Kingdom, and the coordinators of the electoral districts numbering (45) coordinators, based upon Electoral Districts Division Regulation No. 26 of 2010. As for the observers of polling and counting day, they numbered (1,200) observers, distributed among the various electoral districts on the basis of the percentage of the number of ballot boxes in each electoral district out of the total number of ballot boxes in the Kingdom, as set out in Annex No. (2).²

The field monitoring methodology comprised the following steps:

1. Laying down a clear and specific work plan for the implementation of the monitoring exercise.
2. Preparing the requisite training materials, which took into account:
 - a. The international standards for free and honest elections and the international practices and principles for the conduct of election monitoring.
 - b. The manner of using and completing the monitoring forms.
 - c. The plans for communication and the transmission of information from the members of the field monitoring team to the coordinators and to the elections monitoring operations room at the National Centre for Human Rights.
3. Training the observers to monitor the various stages of the electoral process using the training materials referred to above.

² See Annex No. (2), which sets out the table of the distribution of observers on polling and counting day among the electoral districts.

4. Preparing a code of conduct to be observed by the observers. This code included the requirement that the observer have regard to the Jordanian Constitution, national legislation and human rights principles, and emphasized the neutrality and independence of the observers.³
5. Establishing a dedicated operations office and equipping a number of hotlines for communication and the exchange of information with the field teams.
6. Defining the steps of field monitoring so as to comprise:
 - a. The completion of the monitoring forms by the observers in accordance with their direct observations and through field visits to the various government departments concerned with electoral matters.⁴
 - b. The assessment of the conduct of each stage of the electoral process and the furnishing to the Centre of documented reports thereon.
 - c. Direct and continuous coordination with the project management team at the Centre in order to cover significant incidents and to deal with any problems arising during the monitoring exercise.
 - d. The preparation of a report specific to each stage of the electoral process.
 - e. The issue of statements and their publication through the media after each stage of the electoral process.
 - f. The preparation of a fully equipped operations room to ensure the continuity and effectiveness of communication with the field monitoring teams, the recording of their observations and the taking of the measures necessary in respect thereof.
 - g. The analysis and examination of all the data and information obtained by the observers after their entry into the computer under a system prepared by the Centre specifically for this purpose. Frequencies and percentages were extracted for all the questions contained in the forms specific to the monitoring of the stages of the electoral process, which disclosed the extent of the compliance of the entities concerned with providing the guarantees necessary for the proper conduct of this process. It should be mentioned that on polling day the Centre used text messages by means of mobile telephones, which assisted in the rapid arrival of information and the immediate analysis of results by means of a computer programme prepared by the Centre in advance for this purpose, and in monitoring the conduct of the electoral process promptly. This is a technology that assists in achieving that end and was used for the first time in Jordan.⁵

It is worth mentioning that each observer completed seven forms dedicated to polling day,⁶ namely:

1. The form for monitoring the opening of the ballot box and the commencement of the polling operation.
2. The form for monitoring the polling procedures.

³ See Annex No. (3), which sets out the work plan concerning the voter registration process, and Annex No. (4), which sets out the work plan for polling day.

⁴ See Annex No. (7), which sets out the monitoring forms relating to the electoral stages preceding polling day.

⁵ These forms were drawn up by the project management team in cooperation with certain academics specializing in political science and constitutional law at the Jordanian universities.

⁶ See Annex No. (8), which sets out the forms specific to polling day.

3. The form for monitoring the procedures for voting by those unable to read or write, or illiterate voters.
4. The form for monitoring the procedures for the conclusion of polling and the closing of the ballot boxes.
5. The form for monitoring the counting operation in the ballot box.
6. The form for monitoring the results of the count of candidates in the ballot box.
7. The final aggregation form.

In addition to the form for monitoring significant incidents and the monitoring form specific to the centres designated for polling by persons with disabilities.

The number of forms distributed to the observers amounted to 8,500 forms, of which 7,455 were entered into the statistical analysis programme by reason of their completeness as to the information required and their suitability for analysis, the results set out in this report having been extracted on their basis — that is, 87.70%.

The second axis: media monitoring

The Centre monitored the conduct of the electoral process and ascertained on a daily basis what the visual, audio and print media broadcast and published, and verified their accuracy and credibility. The Centre adopted the following mechanism in this monitoring:

1. The mechanism of press monitoring of what the newspapers and websites publish over the electronic information network on a daily basis.
2. The archiving of news items and of everything touching upon the electoral process in dedicated records at the Centre. The Centre will publish the media monitoring of the stages of the electoral process in a separate report.

The third axis: the complaints received by the Centre

The Centre studied and analysed the complaints received by it from voters and candidates relating to the conduct of the electoral process, followed up these complaints and addressed the entities concerned to take the necessary measures in relation to the subject-matter of the complaint where required. The Centre received complaints by the following means:

1. The hotline dedicated at the Centre to receiving complaints.
2. The complainant's direct visit to the Centre to submit his complaint.
3. The Centre's website or by fax.⁷
4. The field documentation of complaints by the observers by virtue of their direct work in monitoring the electoral process.

⁷ The Centre's website was out of service on polling day for unknown reasons; the Centre was consequently unable to receive complaints electronically during election day, nor was it able to upload its data to its website during polling day.

5. The hotlines dedicated to polling day, numbering (14) lines.

The stages of the electoral process that were monitored

The monitoring exercise comprised all the stages of the electoral process, as follows:

First: the voter registration stage

A total of sixty observers representing civil society institutions from the various governorates of the Kingdom were selected and trained on the model procedures for voter registration that may be relied upon in following the registration process, and on the monitoring of any potential violations at this stage — a stage no less important than the other stages of the electoral process, given its effect on the fairness of the elections and the equitable representation of the various segments of society. During this stage the objections submitted to the Civil Status and Passports Department concerning the voters' rolls were also monitored, as were the judicial appeals lodged by voters.

Second: the stage of nomination for membership of the Sixteenth House of Representatives

The National Team⁸ monitored the stage of nomination for the Sixteenth House of Representatives. Members of the Team visited the entity designated to receive those wishing to submit nomination applications, completed the forms specific to this stage, and administered the questionnaire directed to persons wishing to stand for election concerning the conduct of the nomination process and the extent of their satisfaction with it. The Team also monitored the judicial appeals against the decisions of the central committees, whether lodged by persons wishing to stand for election whose applications had been rejected or by voters alike, as well as the mechanisms for dealing with these objections and adjudicating upon them.

Third: the electoral campaigning stage

The National Team monitored the electoral campaigning conducted by the candidates, in order to ascertain the extent of their commitment to preserving national unity and the security and stability of the homeland, to refraining from prejudicing other candidates, and to complying with the designated places for electoral campaigning and with the manner of the use of funds during the electoral campaigns — and, generally, to monitor the extent of the candidates' compliance with the provisions of the Elections Law.

Fourth: the polling and counting day

1,200 observers were selected, trained and distributed among the various polling centres to follow the conduct of the polling and counting operations. Monitoring forms were prepared based upon the Elections Law and the instructions issued thereunder, with the object of verifying the integrity of the entities concerned in their handling of the electoral process and the transparency of the procedures, and of ascertaining that they proceeded in a manner consistent with the Elections Law and with the international standards relating to the right of individuals to free and honest elections.

⁸ The terms “the observers” and “the National Team” are used in this report to denote the same thing.

Fifth: the stage of objections to the election results

The monitoring team followed up the objections and appeals concerning the election results submitted by citizens and candidates alike to the Secretariat-General of the House of Representatives (it will monitor the manner of dealing with these objections and their determination when they are issued).

Sixth: the preparation of reports

The Centre issued six media statements and four reports during the period of the registration of voters and candidates and on polling day. These statements and reports contained a set of preliminary findings reached during the monitoring of the various stages of the electoral process, together with a number of recommendations submitted to the Ministry of the Interior in order to improve the procedures of this process and to guarantee its integrity and transparency.

Fifth: The Centre's observations on the legal framework governing the electoral process

On 23/11/2009 the Royal Will was issued dissolving the Fifteenth House of Representatives. At the same time His Majesty addressed a letter to the Prime Minister in which he required the Government to begin immediately preparing to hold the parliamentary elections and to take all the necessary steps, foremost among them the amendment of the Elections Law and the development of all the procedures of the electoral process, “so that the forthcoming elections may be a model of transparency, fairness and integrity and a bright milestone in Jordan’s reform and modernization march, through which all Jordanians may exercise their right to stand for election and to elect their representatives in the House of Representatives”. The Council of Ministers affirmed its absolute commitment to implementing the Royal Directives, and the Prime Minister decided to form a ministerial committee under his chairmanship to study the existing Law and the administrative divisions in preparation for amending the Law. The Council of Ministers, however, decided at its session held on 8/12/2009 that it was not feasible to hold the parliamentary elections within the four months specified in the second paragraph of Article (73) of the Constitution, and, pursuant to the decision of the Council of Ministers, the Royal Will was issued postponing the holding of the general election of the House of Representatives. His Majesty the King again emphasized the importance of holding parliamentary elections that would be a model of integrity, neutrality and transparency, and which should not be held later than the last quarter of 2010. The Royal letter of designation addressed to the Prime Minister-designate Samir Al-Rifai stated as follows: “And after Our Will was issued dissolving the House of Representatives in preparation for holding new parliamentary elections that shall be a model of integrity, neutrality and transparency, the foremost task of your government shall be to take all the necessary steps, including the amendment of the Elections Law and the improvement of all the procedures of the electoral process, so as to ensure that the forthcoming elections are a qualitative leap in our developmental and modernizing march, and so that all Jordanians may exercise their right to vote and to stand for election and discharge their duty of electing a parliament capable of exercising its constitutional role of oversight and legislation and of contributing effectively to completing the march of construction and to entrenching democracy as a culture and a practice in our beloved homeland”.

The Centre followed with the greatest interest the climate that preceded the issue of the Provisional Elections Law of 2010, the dialogues conducted by civil society institutions and political parties, and likewise the dialogues and consultations conducted by the Government leading up to the issue of the Royal Will, with a view to implementing the Royal Directives to hold the parliamentary elections in the last quarter of 2010 in a manner enabling Jordanians to exercise their right to vote. The Centre wishes at the outset to emphasize that the Royal Will issued approving this Law was coupled with the requirement that it be laid before the National Assembly at its first sitting — a matter emphasized once again by His Majesty the King in the Royal letter of designation to the second government of Mr. Samir Al-Rifai. This means that the provisions contained in it must be the subject of national dialogue leading to an elections law that truly expresses the general will of citizens and enables them to choose their representatives transparently and directly in accordance with procedures consistent with constitutional and international standards.

Notwithstanding the importance of the Elections Law in regulating political life in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, for the sixth time since the return of parliamentary life in Jordan in 1989 the parliamentary elections were held under a provisional law — a matter inconsistent with the spirit of the Jordanian Constitution, which made the “permanent” law issued by the legislative authority the general rule, provisional laws being the exception. Taking into account, however, that this Law became an operative law not subject to annulment according to the legal conventions prevailing in the Kingdom, the Law will be discussed from that standpoint.

The Law contained a number of new provisions, the most important of which are:

1. The replacement of the electoral system from the single non-transferable vote system⁹ with the first-past-the-post system, by dividing the Kingdom into (108) non-geographical sub-districts¹⁰ and raising the number of seats allocated to women to (12) seats, having been six seats under the previous Law, so that the number of seats of the House of Representatives became (120) seats.
2. The appointment of a judge to all the election committees as deputy chairperson of the committee, it being noted that judges had been members of the same committees under the previous Law but without being deputy chairpersons of the committees.
3. Affording civilians working in the armed forces and security agencies the opportunity to participate in the elections.

Since the assessment of the legal framework under which the electoral process took place is regarded as one of the most important axes covered by the election monitoring exercise, the Centre records a number of observations on this Law, the most important of which are:

1. Although the Regulation issued under the Elections Law sought to achieve fairness and equality in the weight of the electoral vote by dividing the electoral districts into sub-districts and allocating a single seat to each of them, this equality was coupled with the division of the sub-districts on notional bases that were not clear and did not have regard to the guarantee of relative equality among them in terms of population, geographical area or developmental dimension.
2. Although the Law contained a positive development in providing for the bases of the allocation of seats within the body of the Law, consistently with the terms of Article 67 of the Constitution, the Law did not contain a division of the districts, including the sub-districts, but referred the matter to the Regulation. It would have been fitting for the districts to be divided by the Law itself, as had previously been the case.
3. Although the Law widened the scale of women’s political participation by doubling the number of women’s seats allocated to their representation at the level of the Kingdom, in application of the

⁹ The single non-transferable vote system means that voters cast their vote for one candidate only in multi-member electoral districts, the candidates obtaining the highest number of votes being elected.

¹⁰ Electoral Districts Division Regulation No. 26 of 2010 divided the Kingdom into electoral districts having geographical dimensions; at the same time, however, the Regulation divided the geographical districts into sub-districts not based on any geographical boundaries.

principle of positive discrimination as a temporary step towards the political empowerment of women, the Law is nevertheless open to criticism in this field on the following grounds:

- a. The failure to achieve equality among female candidates in the various electoral districts, in that the comparison between them for the purpose of determining the successful candidates was calculated on the basis of the number of votes obtained by the female candidate divided by the number of voters in the sub-district and not by the number of voters in the governorate so as to achieve fairness and equality among them — particularly as the allocation of seats to women was made on the basis of the number of governorates and not on the number of sub-districts. This is in order to ensure the consistency of this provision with paragraph (e) of Article 42 of the Law, which provided that in the event that a seat allocated to women in the House of Representatives falls vacant it shall be filled by holding a by-election at the level of the electoral district and not in the sub-district.
 - b. The ambiguity surrounding item 1 of paragraph (b) of Article 42, which states that “... the number of women winning the seats allocated to women in each governorate and in any of the closed Badia electoral districts may not, pursuant to the provisions of this Article, exceed one successful candidate”. It is understood from this text that the number of seats allocated to women amounts to (15) seats and not twelve seats.
4. The Government responded to the recommendation of the National Coalition for the Reform of the Legal Framework of the Electoral Process by broadening the base of popular participation through an increase in the electorate, permitting civilians working in the armed forces, the security agencies and civil defence to exercise their right to vote. The Law nevertheless excluded a wide segment of citizens entitled to vote, namely those detained administratively and judicially and Jordanians residing outside the country.
 5. The Law did not provide for the organization of voters’ rolls in each sub-district, which resulted in difficulty for voters and candidates in inspecting those rolls — a matter inconsistent with their right to verify their accuracy and to object to them, particularly as the period afforded for objection amounts to (7) days, a period that is not sufficient by comparison with the size of the electoral rolls and the names they contain.
 6. Notwithstanding the positive step consisting in the reconstitution of the committees supervising the electoral process at all their levels and the involvement of the judiciary in the administration of the electoral process rather than confining this role to the Government alone — by providing that one of the judges of the higher grade nominated by the President of the Judicial Council shall be deputy chairperson of the Higher Committee, in addition to entrusting the office of deputy chairperson of the sub-district election committees to a judge appointed by the Judicial Council — this step cannot be a substitute for the establishment of a supreme, independent and permanent national commission enjoying neutrality and competence to supervise the stages of the electoral process, headed by a prominent public figure or a judicial figure known for independence and neutrality.
 7. The new mechanism adopted by the Law for voting by illiterate voters is a mechanism that does not achieve the purpose behind it, namely the realization of the principle of the secrecy of the ballot; nor

is it free from complexity. It would have been more appropriate for the ballot paper to be developed in a manner guaranteeing complete secrecy of the ballot, and for the legal and administrative measures to be taken to achieve this — particularly as the Law adopted the mechanism of sub-districts, which reduces the number of candidates within them, thereby facilitating the preparation of ballot papers containing the name of the candidate and his photograph, or a clear symbol denoting him, for the voter to mark, in a manner capable of eliminating the phenomenon of illiterate voting. In addition to the importance of the penal aspect of the Law in relation to violations concerning the voting of illiterate persons — by preventing an illiterate voter from voting if he whispers before the polling committee in an audible voice the name of the candidate he wishes to elect, in addition to a penalty of imprisonment of not less than one year and a fine of not less than two hundred dinars and not more than five hundred dinars for any person who claims illiteracy or an inability to read and write when that is not the case — the general rule is nevertheless that the Law should adopt a mechanism that assists the illiterate voter in exercising his constitutional right to vote.

8. The Law did not address the subject of halting electoral campaigns and campaigning a sufficient time before polling day; nor did it contain provisions relating to equality among candidates in the use of the media for sufficient and equal periods; nor did the Law fix an upper ceiling for expenditure on electoral campaigning.
9. The Law granted wide discretionary powers to the Minister of the Interior in fundamental aspects relating to the integrity and transparency of the elections, in particular as regards the form and specifications of the ballot box, the mechanisms and procedures adopted to ensure that voting is not repeated, and the form and content of the ballot paper — matters which as a general rule should be provided for in the Law.

Many civil society institutions, researchers and academics, foremost among them the National Coalition led by the Centre, had submitted a number of proposals and recommendations calculated to broaden the base of popular participation in the elections and to develop the procedures of the electoral process; the Government, however, did not adopt them, nor did it conduct any dialogue with these bodies. Among the recommendations not adopted by the Government are the following:

1. Changing the age of political majority of the voter so as to permit a person who has completed eighteen solar years of age on the first day of the third month preceding the date fixed for holding the election to exercise his right to vote.
2. Provisional Elections Law No. 9 of 2010 provided in Article (8)(g) that an applicant for nomination for membership of the House of Representatives must not have been sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding one year for a non-political offence without having been covered by a general amnesty. This provision is regarded as contrary to Article (75)(1)(e) of the Constitution, which was framed in absolute terms as to the form of pardon and did not confine it to a general or a special pardon.
3. The adoption of the concept of the electronic publication of the voters' rolls in addition to other means of publication.

4. The taking of the arrangements necessary to guarantee the secrecy of voting for persons with visual impairments.
5. The inclusion in the Law of provisions setting out the conditions that must be satisfied in the polling booth in order to guarantee the privacy of the voter and the secrecy of the ballot.
6. The inclusion in the Law of a provision requiring the polling committee to record in the record of the commencement of the polling operation, and to announce, the number of papers in the committee's possession.
7. The counting of the ballot papers inside the box before beginning to read out the names.

Sixth: Monitoring the stages and conduct of voter registration

1. Monitoring the stage of voter registration and the preparation of the electoral rolls

The National Team commenced its work of monitoring the stage of registration and the preparation of the voters' rolls as from the morning of Saturday 12/6/2010,¹¹ on the basis of a work plan for organizing the monitoring exercise and maintaining communication between the Centre and the observers at this stage.

During this stage the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Chairman of the Higher Elections Committee, was addressed on four occasions with the most significant violations accompanying the voter registration process. A press statement was likewise issued and distributed to all newspapers containing the most important observations recorded by the National Team. It should be noted here that all the original signed monitoring forms documenting these observations were collected and retained at the National Centre for Human Rights. The results of monitoring this stage of the electoral process are as follows:

General observations

Most of the staff at the registration centres displayed compliance with the instructions for the preparation of the voters' rolls, and most of them did not yield to the various pressures exerted upon them by citizens, candidates and their representatives. Observers indicated in (540) reports the existence of attempts by certain persons to bring the personal cards of citizens not related to them in the first degree of kinship and to endeavour to have the electoral district endorsed on them, particularly at the Madaba and Bani Obeid civil status centres in Irbid Governorate, Naour and Ashrafiyya in the Capital, and Fuheis and Salt in Balqa Governorate; the staff, however, rejected these transactions after verifying the documents required under the instructions. The monitoring team likewise recorded that individuals working in the interest of others intending to stand for election exerted pressure upon staff and members of the public alike in an attempt to register voters in their favour. At certain centres — such as the Bani Kinana District civil status centre in Irbid Governorate and the Marka and Naour civil status centres in the Capital Governorate — such persons were permitted to enter areas designated for staff only, such as the hall designated for printing personal civil status cards. The Centre thereupon notified the Civil Status Department of these incidents, and was informed of the Civil Status Department's intention to hold a meeting with the Public Security Directorate to curb such conduct.

During the second and third weeks of the registration period, the monitoring team observed a reluctance on the part of certain voters to register and a decline in the proportion of registrants at most centres,¹² for the following reasons:

1. The fees imposed for endorsing the electoral district, renewing the civil status card, transferring from one district to another, and issuing a replacement for a damaged or lost card. The Centre addressed

¹¹ Annex No. (9) sets out the table of registration centres monitored by the National Team.

¹² For further detail on this plan, see Annex No. (3), which sets out the plan for monitoring the voter registration procedures.

the Ministry of the Interior in this regard and the fees imposed for endorsing the district were abolished.

2. The requirement that males born in 1989, 1990 and 1991 produce a national service booklet establishing that they had deferred national service, notwithstanding that the instructions for the preparation of the voters' rolls issued by the Minister of the Interior do not require this. The Centre addressed the Civil Status and Passports Department in this regard on 28/6/2010, and instructions were issued halting this procedure.
3. The requirement that citizens of Palestinian origin whose fathers were born outside Jordan attend the Follow-up and Inspection Department, contrary to the instructions for the preparation of the voters' rolls issued by the Minister of the Interior. This procedure led a number of voters to refrain from registering out of fear that their national numbers would be withdrawn. The Centre addressed the Ministry of the Interior in this regard, and the Minister of the Interior circulated to all centres an instruction to halt this procedure.

In addition, the monitoring team recorded a number of observations which may have adversely affected the registration process, namely:

1. That 48% of the registration centres were not equipped to receive persons with disabilities.
2. That 26% of the registration centres contained no guidance boards clearly setting out the mechanism for voter registration.
3. That 28% of the centres contained no guidance boards indicating that they were accredited centres for voter registration.
4. The ambiguity of the mechanism for transferring students' transactions from the voter registration centres at the universities to the offices of the Civil Status Department.
5. The dissatisfaction of university students at the absence of powers on the part of the registration offices there to accept applications for the transfer of electoral districts or for the renewal of identity cards.

The Government treated the voters' rolls of 2007 as the basis for the voters' rolls of 2010, a procedure the Centre criticized as leading to the perpetuation of the defects that had accompanied the elections of 2007. The Centre demanded that the position be rectified and that the voter's place of residence or place of origin be adopted as the basis of registration, in accordance with the Elections Law and the instructions for the preparation of the voters' rolls issued by the Minister of the Interior for 2010. The Centre affirms that the Civil Status Department did not comply with Article (5) of the Elections Law, which charged it with preparing the voters' rolls on the basis of place of residence and on the basis of the national number: the Civil Status Department did not prepare new electoral rolls specific to 2010 and relied upon the rolls of the 2007 elections. The Centre drew attention to the fact that this contravenes the Elections Law, and the Ministry of the Interior replied that time did not permit the preparation of new voters' rolls and that these rolls would be rectified by opening the door to objection to them by citizens before the Civil Status Department — a matter that subsequently led to the return of 165,000 citizens to the districts of their original residence.

Observations on the performance of the staff at the voter registration offices

The National Monitoring Team recorded the following observations on the performance of the staff at the voter registration offices:

1. The failure to take the measures necessary against certain citizens who were bringing in transactions for the transfer of electoral districts over several days and repeatedly.
2. The acceptance and registration by a member of staff at one of the centres of transactions for persons who did not satisfy the registration conditions set out in the instructions issued by the Ministry of the Interior, and the endorsement and transfer of the electoral district by staff at other centres on the basis of the written declaration of the applicant instead of obtaining the required documents.¹³
3. Permitting the transfer of the names of individuals belonging to one family to the Northern Badia district through the tribal mukhtar, notwithstanding that they were not among the people of the Northern Badia under the Districts Division Regulation.
4. The transfer of voters at registration centres situated outside the districts endorsed on their civil status cards, at civil status offices situated outside the district from which or to which the transfer was made.¹⁴
5. The refusal of a member of staff in Ma'an Governorate to assist an illiterate person in completing the identity card renewal form.
6. The opening of the Hashimiyya registration centre / Zarqa Governorate by two members of staff after half past ten at night, which aroused suspicion among citizens; when questioned by citizens as to the reason for opening the doors of the centre at that hour, they replied that they had attended in order to complete certain transactions.
7. The existence of violations in the transfer process from the Bani Kinana district in Irbid Governorate to other districts without completion of the supporting documents necessary for that purpose, and the markedly lax approach of the centre director to the transfer procedures.
8. The use by a member of staff of the director's seal and his passing of transactions whose procedures were incomplete in the Northern Shuna area in Irbid Governorate.

Although these phenomena may appear to be individual acts, taken together they indicate a failure by a number of the staff at the voter registration offices to comply with the provisions of the Law and the instructions issued thereunder.

Observations on the conduct of persons wishing to stand for election

Proceeding from the Centre's desire to carry out comprehensive monitoring of the conduct of the electoral process, including the monitoring of the conduct of public officials, of those wishing to stand for election

¹³ The Team monitored overcrowding by members of the public at the following centres during this period: Qasabat Irbid and Bani Obeid – Irbid; Salt, South Shuna and Deir Alla – Balqa; Russeifa – Zarqa; Naour, Marka, West Amman and Sweileh in the Capital; Southern Mazar – Karak; and the Mafraq, Ajloun and Madaba offices.

¹⁴ Such as the Naour and Wadi Seer centres in the Capital.

and of ordinary citizens, and in adherence to accuracy, fidelity and objectivity, the Centre also recorded a number of violations by those wishing to stand for election, among them:

1. The existence of cases of the registration of voters by persons intending to stand for election or by their representatives throughout the registration period, such persons paying the fees payable for the renewal of the personal civil status card or for transfer from one district to another and defraying the costs of photography — which led to an accumulation of identity cards at the civil status centres¹⁵ and to the accumulated number at certain centres reaching one thousand cards. The Team also monitored the cooperation of staff at the Naour, Ramtha, Deir Abi Said and Taybeh civil status centres with such persons by reason of a relationship of kinship, affinity or friendship.
2. An attempt by a former deputy who intended to stand for election to transfer 100 civil status cards from the Fourth District in Balqa Governorate to the First District in the same Governorate in order to benefit from their votes; the centre director, however, rejected these transactions.
3. The attendance of a delegate of one of those wishing to stand for election at the main Irbid registration centre carrying 73 identity cards.
4. An attempt to pass transactions in favour of a former deputy at the Irbid registration office without the attendance of the persons concerned, the transactions having been completed and signed by a single person. The transactions were halted at the final stages by reason of the observation and follow-up of a member of the National Monitoring Team.
5. The exploitation of the building of one of the associations in the Madaba area in favour of one of those wishing to stand for election, and his threatening to cut off assistance to certain beneficiaries of the association's services in the event that they did not vote for that person.
6. An attempt to transfer cards unlawfully by the son of a former deputy for the Salt area from the Irbid area, and the continuation of complaints against him in the Salt area, it being noted that the director of the civil status and passports office was facilitating the process of transferring the cards — in addition to the resort of this person to the use of foul language.
7. The hiring by one of those wishing to stand for election in the Khalidiyya area – Mafraq Governorate of vehicles to transport citizens, and the holding of meetings with citizens in their homes. He also had delegates who caused confusion at the centre and collected identity cards, and the candidate assisted his relatives by providing services to citizens, such as increasing the pumping of water to their homes.

Electoral campaigning during the registration period

The National Monitoring Team recorded that many persons wishing to nominate themselves commenced the process of electoral campaigning through the daily newspapers or by distributing leaflets in mosques,¹⁶ which constitutes a manifest violation of the provisions governing electoral campaigning as set out in Elections Law No. 9 of 2010; the Government took no measure to halt this. The Team

¹⁵ An example of this is the transfers made from Zarqa Governorate to Irbid Governorate, the transfers to the Third District in the Capital, and transfers from the Second District to the Fourth District in Irbid Governorate.

¹⁶ An example of this is what occurred at the Naour Civil Status Office and the Madaba Civil Status Office.

observed the spread of new forms of electoral campaigning through the use by certain persons wishing to stand for election of private photographic studios and the placing of advertisements on them indicating that they were accredited by those persons to photograph their supporters free of charge; this phenomenon was monitored in Madaba and Amman Governorates. The Team likewise monitored that the support committees of certain persons wishing to stand for the parliamentary elections sent short messages to citizens to encourage them to have the electoral district endorsed; the spread of advertisements in Madaba Governorate in the public streets was also observed. The National Team further monitored the broadcasting of electoral advertisements for those wishing to stand for election on satellite channels and websites, including Al-Haqiqa, Zwaina, Super Star, Seven Stars, Baladna and Diretna, contrary to the law.

Procedural observations on the method and methodology of work during the registration period

The National Monitoring Team recorded a number of procedural observations on the method of work during the registration period which led to disruption of the work, the most prominent of them being:

1. A shortage in the numbers of staff working at the Kufranja – Ajloun, Russeifa – Zarqa, Khalidiyya, Sabha and Subhiyya – Mafraq, Qasabat Irbid and Northern Shuna – Irbid, and Deir Alla and Subeihi – Balqa civil status centres, in addition to the small number of machines available for issuing identity cards at the Bani Obeid, Northern Shuna, main Irbid and Zarqa centres — which led to delay in the issue of identity cards for varying periods reaching three days in some cases.
2. The requirement by staff at the registration centres that a recent personal photograph be produced by any person wishing to have the electoral district endorsed. Citizens complained of this procedure, since it came after they had waited for hours before being informed of it, it being noted that this is a discretionary matter subject to the assessment and powers of the departmental official. It also imposed a financial burden upon the citizen owing to the high photography charges levied by the photographic studios which exploited this period.
3. The repeated breakdown of the identity card issuing machines at each of the Ajloun, Wadi Seer, Madaba, Ramtha, South Shuna, Marka, Sabha and Subhiyya centres.
4. Delay in the issue of cards for several days at certain registration centres, such as the Ma'an and Subeihi/Balqa, Bani Obeid/Irbid, Zarqa and Marka registration centres.
5. The failure to give a receipt to members of the public acknowledging the staff member's receipt of the identity cards, which led to disruption of the process of citizens receiving their identity cards subsequently.
6. The lack of clarity of the advertisements concerning the completion of transactions as regards fees, documents and personal photographs, which were published on Jordan Television and in the daily newspapers urging citizens to register at the civil status centres, including the instructions for the registration of those residing outside the Kingdom — which led to obstruction and delay in the procedures for issuing personal cards endorsed with the electoral district.

7. The absence of signs indicating the voter registration centre in Southern Mazar in Karak Governorate until after the arrival of the Prime Minister, and the widening of the powers of the centre after that visit, its work having been confined to the endorsement of the electoral district only.
8. A complaint by a member of the Public Security against a member of staff working at the Naour centre to the effect that this member of staff was receiving and delivering certain identity cards without verifying the identity of the recipient.
9. Repeated instances of interruption of the electricity supply and of the electronic network linking the civil status offices for varying periods extending from hours in some instances to three days in others, which led to delay in transactions.
10. The suspension of registration at the Marka registration centre for four days owing to equipment failure.
11. The failure to endorse the electoral district on civil status cards issued as replacements for lost cards, which meant depriving the holder of such a card of exercising his right to vote — particularly young persons who had reached the age of eighteen and whose lost cards had not borne an electoral district.
12. The collective registration of civilian employees among the personnel of the armed forces during the final week of the registration period by means of name lists, contrary to the voter registration instructions requiring the attendance of the person himself or of a member of his family.
13. The suspension of the issue of identity cards for one day at the Madaba civil status office owing to the absence of the requisite raw materials from the supplier.
14. The refusal of the Deir Alla civil status office to register 70 transactions, which were thereafter accepted at the Salt civil status office.
15. The bringing by a person of photographs of other persons and their affixing to identity cards at the Ain Al-Basha centre.

Observations relating to human rights violations and to abuse of office

The National Monitoring Team recorded a set of observations that may fall under the head of abuse of office, as follows:

1. The provision by certain mayors and members of municipal councils intending to nominate themselves of services to certain citizens with the object of obtaining the largest number of votes, which constitutes a dangerous precedent of the exploitation of official position to influence the will of voters. The Government, represented by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, took measures to prevent mayors from exploiting their positions for electoral purposes; the West Irbid municipal council, for example, was dissolved on account of the mayor working in favour of one of the candidates.
2. An assault by an officer of the security agencies at one of the registration centres, while present in the office of the director of the Bayader Wadi Seer civil status centre, upon a member of the public who had entered the office of the centre director and protested against the fees for renewing the civil status card.

3. The use of foul language by the director of the Bani Kinana District civil status centre towards members of the public, his bias in favour of one of the candidates who was a relative of his, and his exploitation of his office for his personal benefit. This official was transferred from his post.
4. Identity cards were renewed free of charge in the final week of the registration period in order to increase the proportion of registrants, which indicates preferential treatment.

It should be noted that throughout the voter registration period the Centre was in continuous contact with the Ministry of the Interior and the Civil Status and Passports Department in order to furnish them with the most significant observations and violations monitored at this stage and with the recommendations necessary to halt the violations and improve the voter registration procedures. The Centre values in this context the response of the Ministry of the Interior and the Civil Status and Passports Department to a number of the recommendations, the most important of which are:

1. Halting the procedures requiring the renewal of the national service booklet from young men born in 1989, 1990 and 1991.
2. Halting the procedures for referring citizens of Palestinian origin whose fathers were born outside Jordan to the Follow-up and Inspection Department.
3. Including in the voters' rolls the name, national number, place of registration, identity-issuing office and place of residence, so as to afford citizens the opportunity to challenge at the registration centre situated in the district within which the name of the voter who is the subject of the objection is listed, in furtherance of the principle of transparency and in order to facilitate matters for citizens wishing to inspect the voters' rolls and/or to object to them, upon the recommendation of the National Centre for Human Rights.
4. Affording citizens the opportunity to object to the rolls in the district in which the objector or the person who is the subject of the objection is registered.
5. Publishing the voters' rolls on the websites of the relevant governmental institutions.

2. Monitoring the stage of the display of the electoral rolls

The National Team monitored the stage of the display of the voters' rolls, which continued for seven days during the period from 1 to 7/8/2010. In this framework the Team recorded a number of observations concerning the mechanism for displaying the electoral rolls, given the importance of this stage as the instrument enabling the citizen to work towards correcting the rolls and removing the violations of the registration stage.

Observations on the manner of displaying the electoral rolls

The National Monitoring Team recorded a number of observations on the manner of displaying the electoral rolls, as follows:

1. All voter registration centres, save for one only (the Ajloun Civil Status Directorate office), displayed the voters' rolls at the time and on the date fixed by the Ministry of the Interior and the administrative

governors on 1/8/2010, in the form of a paper copy for males and another for females. The pages of these rolls, however, were not numbered, and in a number of them the names were not clear — which impeded the process of citizens inspecting them. Moreover, the fact that most of the rolls contained tens of thousands of voters' names did not enable citizens to review them as required; in addition, a number of delegates of persons intending to stand for election took possession of these lists from the early morning hours in order to scrutinize them, thereby preventing others from inspecting them. This paper method of display, with the attendant problems, continued for two days. The Centre demanded of the Ministry of the Interior, by letter dated 2/8/2010, the necessity of publishing the voters' rolls electronically; many civil society institutions, citizens and persons wishing to stand for election demanded the same. The Ministry responded to these demands and published the rolls electronically on its official website on 3/8/2010, that is two days after the day specified in the law.

2. The existence of a difference between the numbers of voters in the paper rolls and their number in the electronic rolls,¹⁷ in addition to the fact that the rolls did not contain the information relating to the voter's place of civil registration and his number, so as to facilitate the process of challenging names transferred from outside the electoral district — quite apart from the fact that the rolls were not arranged alphabetically but by national number, which resulted in delay in locating voters' names and prevented all members of the public from inspecting them, thereby constituting an obstacle to the citizen verifying the propriety of the registration of others.
3. The existence in the electoral rolls of names of voters from outside the district and the governorate, as was the case in the Seventh District in the Capital Governorate, the Second and Third Districts in Zarqa Governorate, the First and Second Districts in Tafilah Governorate, the Second District in Madaba Governorate, and the Northern Badia and Southern Badia districts. This was confirmed by the results of the determination of the objections submitted to the Civil Status Department, illustrated in Figure No. (2), and by the judicial appeals submitted to the competent courts, illustrated in Table No. (5).
4. The voters' rolls in Balqa Governorate, in the Sixth District in Karak Governorate and in the Sixth District in the Capital Governorate contained duplicated names of voters. Names of deceased persons were likewise found in the rolls displayed in Madaba Governorate and in the Third District in Zarqa Governorate. In addition, the voters' rolls in the Sixth District in Karak Governorate contained names of persons enlisted in the armed forces and the security agencies, which constitutes a violation of the provisions of the Elections Law.
5. The endorsement of incorrect places of residence for certain voters in the rolls, contrary to the facts and to what was endorsed on the civil status card.
6. The failure of the centres of the North-Western Badia Governorate Administration, the Muwaqqar District Administration, the Naour Civil Status and Passports Office and the Karak Secondary School centre to display the voters' rolls at the time specified. The Naour Civil Status and Passports Office likewise did not display the electoral rolls on 3/8/2010 on the pretext that they had been stolen from

¹⁷ An example of this is what occurred in Qasabat Al-Mafraq and in the First, Third and Sixth Districts in the Capital.

that office, according to the reply of the assistant director of the office to enquiries from citizens as to the reasons for the failure to display them.

7. The display by the Ashrafiyya Civil Status and Passports Office of the voters' rolls for two electoral districts, namely the Second and the Fourth Districts, which caused overcrowding of citizens, particularly given the restricted space. The same was the case at the building of the Capital Governorate, in which the rolls of the voters of the Second and Third Districts were displayed.
8. The refusal to permit citizens in the Zahran area in the Third District of the Capital Governorate to inspect certain lists in person, owing to the refusal of the official responsible for displaying the rolls, and the failure to furnish citizens with any information from the lists; the searching of citizens proceeding to the building of the Capital Governorate to inspect the voters' rolls and the impounding of their mobile telephones until they left the building; in addition to requiring personal identity cards from members of the public and prohibiting the entry of any person not carrying a personal identity card — which led many of them to refrain from consulting the rolls.
9. The endorsement of the expression “computer” on the personal civil status cards of a number of voters under the heading of the place of issue of the identity card, which made it difficult for the voter to object to them, since the expression “computer” does not indicate the centre that issued the card — meaning that the office or directorate to which the objection should be submitted was unknown.

Observations on the places of display of the electoral rolls

The National Monitoring Team recorded a number of observations concerning the places of display of the voters' rolls, the most prominent of these observations being as follows:

1. The unsuitability and lack of readiness of the places designated for the display of the voters' rolls, owing to their restricted size and the absence of places large enough to display rolls containing tens of thousands of names — which led to a weak turnout of citizens to inspect them throughout the period of their display. The concept of the display of the rolls set out in the Elections Law does not mean merely that they be placed in cardboard boxes or paper files and that citizens be required to search for their names among tens of thousands of voters' names; what is intended is rather that it be easy for any citizen wishing to inspect them to do so and to be able to ascertain whether his name or the name of any person of concern to him appears in these rolls, or whether these rolls contain names of persons not entitled to be registered in them.
2. The electoral rolls in the First District in the Capital Governorate and in the Fourth District in Zarqa Governorate were displayed at the announced display locations on the second floor; these places lacked lifts, which created difficulty for elderly citizens and persons with disabilities in inspecting them.
3. The citizens of Jiza were obliged to travel to the places of display of the voters' rolls within the Amman Fourth area, a distance of 25 kilometres away (the building of the Quweisma District Administration, the Sahab District Administration, and the Ashrafiyya Civil Status Office), in order to inspect their names in the rolls, since their names were not present in Jiza — the Jiza area being the place where

the names of the voters of the Central Badia are displayed. This imposed a financial and physical burden upon them. Citizens in the Umm Qusair area, which falls within Jiza, were likewise obliged to travel a distance exceeding 35 kilometres to reach the specified places of display.

4. Citizens at the Balqa Governorate centre were permitted to photograph the lists by means of mobile telephones, whereas the remaining centres in the Governorate refused to allow this.

It should be noted that the Ministry of the Interior responded to the Centre's recommendation that all citizens be afforded the opportunity to exercise the right of objection to the voters' rolls before the registrar of the civil status and passports office of the electoral district in which the electoral rolls were displayed, in addition to the registrar of the civil status and passports office of the place of issue of the personal card. The Ministry of the Interior likewise responded to the Centre's recommendation that citizens be afforded the opportunity to object to more than one person by using a single list containing all the names of those objected to in the electoral district, rather than by submitting a separate objection for each name, and irrespective of the place of issue of their personal cards. This assisted in purging the voters' rolls through an increase in the number of objections submitted to the Civil Status Department, which resulted in the transfer of large numbers of voters to their correct districts.

3. Monitoring the conduct of objections to the voters' rolls

The National Team monitored the stage of objection to the voters' rolls, which continued for seven days during the period from 8 to 14/8/2010. In this framework a number of observations were recorded concerning the process of objecting to the electoral rolls, the most prominent of which were:

1. The offices of the Civil Status and Passports Department began receiving applications for objection to the electoral rolls on the morning of Sunday 8-8-2010, consistently with the time frame specified in the Elections Law. The monitoring team observed from the outset that the submission of appeals was confined to the place of issue of the personal card, which constituted an obstacle to citizens exercising their right to object to the electoral rolls. This prompted the Centre to address the Government by its letter No. H/849/1/Elections dated 8/8/2010 requesting the acceptance of the objection in the district in which the objecting voter is registered; many civil society institutions and many persons wishing to stand for election demanded the same. The Government acceded to this request, which led to an increase in the numbers of objectors and in the numbers of voters objected to. The Centre values in this regard the response of the Ministry of the Interior to the Centre's request to make the electoral rolls available on the Ministry of the Interior's website, which facilitated the process of citizens inspecting and reviewing them electronically and printing them.
2. Citizens relied upon a number of grounds in submitting their objections to the voters' rolls,¹⁸ the most prominent of which are:
 - a. The existence of names of voters resident outside the electoral district — 59.4%.
 - b. The existence of errors in the voters' data — 15.6%.

¹⁸ See Annex No. (10) concerning the difference between the numbers of voters in the paper rolls and in the electronic rolls.

- c. The appearance of names of deceased persons in the electoral rolls — 10.4%.
- d. The appearance of names of persons who do not satisfy the conditions for voting specified in the Elections Law, such as those adjudged bankrupt — 1.2%.
- e. The existence of names of persons whose exercise of this right has been suspended by the Elections Law, such as military personnel serving in the armed forces, the Public Security, the Civil Defence and the Gendarmerie Forces — 3.1%.
- f. The failure of names of persons satisfying the conditions for voting to appear — 8.3%.
- g. The appearance of names of persons sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding one year for a non-political offence — 1%.

Table No. (1) sets out the number of objections estimated by the monitoring team to the voters' rolls in the electoral districts, as follows:

Table No. (1): Numbers of objections and the percentage of each district in the registration of objections

Governorate / District	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	Total objections in the governorate	% of total objections
The Capital	58700	4445	180000	11040	46484	19600	5030			325299	53.1
Irbid	22539	3808	17	406	615	125	589	1084	1654	30837	5.0
Balqa	128112	427	2377	894						131810	21.5
Karak	564	1500	12888	nil	4	nil				14956	2.4
Ma'an	14050	nil	nil							14050	2.3
Zarqa	3000	3225	234	3299						9758	1.6
Mafraq	13318									13318	2.2
Tafilah	5200	712								5912	1.0
Madaba	523	412								935	0.2
Jerash	46826									46826	7.6
Ajloun	4571	2261								6832	1.1
Aqaba	4100									4100	0.7
Northern Badia	2728									2728	0.4
Central Badia	20									20	0.0
Southern Badia	5100									5100	0.8
Total										612481	100

Translator's note: footnote 21 in the original states that the figures and percentages in this table may differ from the official figures, being based on the reports and on the information furnished to the National Monitoring Team by the civil status offices.

It is observed from the table that there is a discrepancy between the figures recorded by the monitoring team and the figures announced by the Civil Status and Passports Department, amounting to 420 thousand objections according to the statement of the political adviser to the Prime Minister, the official spokesperson

for the parliamentary elections,¹⁹ dated 24/8/2010. The difference between the two figures is attributable to the fact that the monitoring team's figures are estimates, given the refusal of certain civil status offices in the Capital Governorate to furnish the Team with the final figures for the numbers of objectors, on the pretext that these had been delivered to the General Directorate of Civil Status and Passports in the Capital. A member of the monitoring team was likewise required to submit a petition to the Director-General of the Civil Status Department in order to be furnished with the final figure for objections. It should be noted that the National Centre addressed the Ministry of the Interior on 24/8/2010 requesting to be furnished with electronic copies of the voters' rolls and of the list of objections submitted against them, divided by governorate and electoral district; the Ministry of the Interior, however, declined to meet the Centre's request on 1/9/2010 on the ground that the electoral rolls were passing through their legal stages relating to objection and had not, to that date, acquired final status.

Upon comparing the number of objections submitted this year with the number of objections submitted in 2007, which amounted to 27 thousand objections, it appears that the numbers of objections this year multiplied by more than fifteen times over the objections of 2007 — which confirms the importance of the electoral administration adopting the principle of transparency in the preparation and publication of the electoral lists, including the use of electronic means for the publication of these lists, particularly as the electoral administration responsible for the 2007 elections did not publish the voters' rolls electronically and did not enable citizens to inspect and scrutinize them and to submit objections to them. The Centre is of the view that the increase in the numbers of those objected to is attributable to the following reasons:

- a. The submission by certain persons of objections against the same lists in the names of different persons, out of fear that one of them might be lost at the Civil Status Department — a matter that may reflect a lack of confidence on the part of the citizen in governmental bodies generally.
- b. The resort of certain persons intending to nominate themselves to objecting to the lists of voters who constitute an electoral base for their competitors.
- c. The lack of knowledge on the part of objectors of the bases and criteria adopted by the Civil Status Department in endorsing the electoral district for those belonging to a district who reside outside it and who wish to exercise their electoral right therein.

3. Among the violations recorded by the monitoring team against the electoral administration in the field of objection to the voters' rolls are the following:

- a. The determination by certain offices of the Civil Status Department of some personal objection applications on the first day of the objection process. On 8/8/2010, however, a circular was issued by the Director-General of the Civil Status Department prohibiting the determination of objections until the commencement of the period specified for the stage of determining objections. The monitoring team also observed in this context the secrecy maintained by officials as to the results of the determinations issued on that day.

¹⁹ By way of example, the number trebled: according to the figures announced by the official spokesperson for the parliamentary elections, Mr. Samih Al-Maaytah, the number of objections registered on the first day was 27 thousand objections, and on the second day 78 thousand objections.

- b. The connection of the objections submitted with violations that had accompanied the preparation of the 2010 rolls, as well as their comprising violations that had accompanied the preparation of the rolls of previous years. It is worth noting that at the stage of voter registration and the preparation of the electoral rolls the Centre had recorded the existence of clipped and stamped identity cards by virtue of which votes had been cast in 2003 and 2007, without the district being endorsed on them.
- c. The requirement of the attendance of the person concerned to submit the objection and the refusal to permit a member of the family to do so, along the same lines as at the stage of the preparation of the voters' rolls.
- d. The failure of the Civil Status and Passports Department in certain cases to verify the supporting documents of the objector — such as the personal card and birth certificate — on the pretext that the personal information was available at the civil status offices.
- e. The extension of the period for submitting objections on the final day in Irbid Governorate owing to pressure at certain centres in the Governorate, which is contrary to law.
- f. Delay by the objection-submission centres in Madaba Governorate in placing signs indicating them until the middle of the week designated for this purpose.

4. Monitoring the conduct of the determination of objections to the electoral rolls

The National Monitoring Team followed the stage of the determination of objections carried out by the Civil Status and General Passports Department during the period extending from 15 August to 4 September 2010. For this purpose the Department formed committees to determine the objections submitted against the electoral rolls; thereafter the administrative governors were furnished with the determination decisions issued on the objections submitted, on the date specified, namely 5–7/9/2010. The lists were published at the same places at which the preliminary voters' rolls had been displayed. The lists of those objected to contained the following information: the type of objection, the office of the decision, the number of the decision, the date of the decision, the substance of the decision (the new district), the national number, and the name of the voter — thereby facilitating matters for those wishing to lodge a judicial appeal to exercise this right.

The National Monitoring Team recorded the numbers of voters objected to and the numbers added and transferred in each district by governorate, as illustrated in Tables Nos. (2) and (3), following the determination by the Civil Status Department of citizens' objections to the electoral lists according to the lists of the Ministry of the Interior. The total number of objections accepted by the Civil Status and General Passports Department amounted to some 165 thousand objections, and was as follows:

Table No. (2): Percentage of the numbers added to each district as a result of the determination of the objections submitted to the Civil Status Department against the voters' rolls, compared with the number of voters registered in the preliminary rolls of that district

Governorate / District	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th
The Capital	10.4	15.5	10.4	11.5	10.4	10.2	4.3		

Governorate / District	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th
Irbid	3.2	0.2	0.8	0.5	1	0.7	1.5	0.6	0.9
Balqa	2.4	6	3.3	15.6					
Karak	2.7	2.2	0.7	1	0.3	0.8			
Ma'an	1.4	1.2	0.7						
Zarqa	11.8	4.7	4.6	11					
Mafrq	1.7								
Tafilah	0.7	0.5							
Madaba	2.8	1.1							
Jerash	1.6								
Ajloun	1.1	0.4							
Aqaba	4.1								
Northern Badia	0								
Central Badia	0								
Southern Badia	0								

Table No. (3): Percentage of the numbers transferred to each district as a result of the determination of the objections submitted to the Civil Status Department against the voters' rolls, compared with the number of voters registered in the preliminary rolls of that district

Governorate / District	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th
The Capital	6.7	8.3	23.2	3	18.2	18.6	12.2		
Irbid	0	0.4	0	0	0.7	0	2.3	1.1	3.7
Balqa	10.6	1.5	3.4	3.7					
Karak	0.9	6.7	2.9	0	0	1.5			
Ma'an	5.4	0	0						
Zarqa	0.4	12.8	2.8	3.2					
Mafrq	3.5								
Tafilah	10.2	7.7							
Madaba	0	2.4							
Jerash	5.6								
Ajloun	0.5	2.4							
Aqaba	7.4								
Northern Badia	1.8								
Central Badia	0.4								
Southern Badia	2.1								

[Figure No. (1): Percentage of the numbers leaving each electoral district in all districts of the Kingdom. Figure No. (2): Percentage of the numbers entering each district. The two charts in the Arabic original are based on the data of Tables (2) and (3) above.]

Figure No. (1) illustrates the percentage of the numbers leaving the electoral districts in all districts of the Kingdom. The chart shows that the Capital Governorate received the greatest share of the number of votes transferred, at 64%. It is worth noting that the Third District in the Capital Governorate was the largest district witnessing the transfer of voters out of it and their return to their original districts, at 23%, followed in second place by the Fifth District at 14% and the Second District at 11%. It is observed that approximately a quarter of those registered in the Third District, a seventh of those registered in the Fifth District and a tenth of those registered in the Second District in the Capital Governorate were not voters resident in those districts — an indicator disclosing the role of candidates in those districts in transferring voters into them from other districts.

Figure No. (2) likewise illustrates the percentage of the numbers entering each district, as follows: the chart shows the numbers of those registered in districts other than the place of residence or the origin of the family. The Capital Governorate received the largest share of the numbers returning to their original districts, at 69%; the Third District in the Capital Governorate came first at 10%, followed by the Second District at 10% and the First District at 7%. This is an indicator of the extent of the desire of voters to return to the districts of their tribal concentration.

On another level, a number of observations on the stage of the determination of objections were monitored, the most prominent of them being:

- a. The mechanism adopted by the civil status departments — as regards the legal exceptions concerning the registration of Christians, Circassians and Chechens at the stage of the determination of objections — caused many of them to be returned to districts in which they have no seat according to place of residence or origin.
- b. The lists of the decisions determining the objections to the voters' rolls were displayed electronically on the website of the Ministry of the Interior and in paper form at the same places at which the preliminary rolls had been displayed.
- c. The monitoring team recorded in the First District / Balqa Governorate on 7/9/2010 the refusal of the official responsible for publishing the voters' lists at the Salt Municipality building to do so until 12 noon; on the same day the official responsible for publishing the voters' lists at the Balqa Governorate building prevented citizens from viewing the rolls, by leaving the Governorate building and locking the door of the place of display of the rolls.

5. Monitoring the conduct of judicial appeals concerning the electoral rolls

The National Team for monitoring the electoral process followed the stage of appeals against the decisions issued by the offices of the civil status departments, submitted to the courts of first instance. This period extended from 8 to 13/9/2010 and was interrupted by the Eid Al-Fitr holiday; the President of the Judicial Council, however, circulated to all courts of first instance an instruction to conduct their business during the holiday. The coincidence of the judicial appeal period with the Eid Al-Fitr holiday caused many citizens

to refrain from exercising their right to appeal against the decisions issued by the civil status departments, owing to their social and religious obligations, in addition to the difficulty of contacting lawyers during this period in order to instruct them in appeal cases.

The courts of first instance received the appeals submitted by citizens, which amounted to 443 appeals according to the courts' data, whereas they amounted to 440 appeals according to the information obtained by the monitoring team working in the field. Table No. (4) illustrates the numbers of appeals submitted to the courts by governorate and the numbers of those appealed against, as monitored by the National Team.²⁰

Table No. (4): Numbers of appeals submitted to the courts by governorate

Governorate	Number of appeals
Irbid	30
Karak	33
Ma'an	14
Southern Badia	40
Aqaba	0
Ma'raq	34
Amman	63 (6 East Amman Court, 16 Amman Court of First Instance, 10 West Amman, 12 South Amman, 19 North Amman)
Zarqa	30
Madaba	3
Balqa	171
Tafilah	2
Jerash	11
Ajloun	9
Total	440

Notwithstanding that appeals are free of charge, as provided in Article 16 of Elections Law No. 9 of 2010, the requirements of the Bar Association Law in Article 41(2) and of the Civil Procedure Law in Article 63(1) do not permit appearance before the courts of first instance otherwise than through the instruction of a lawyer — a matter that imposed upon citizens financial burdens amounting to 14 dinars and 40 piastres as a fee for the power of attorney should they wish to lodge appeals, in addition to lawyers' fees, which limited the lodging of appeals.

It was observed that there were no guidance boards at the courts to assist members of the public by directing them as to how to deal with electoral cases. It was likewise observed that the courts did not provide a ready-made form prepared as a statement of claim for the appeal, which prevented a number of members of the public from ascertaining the details required for filing the claim and left matters obscure and dependent upon the knowledge of lawyers.

²⁰ These percentages are based on the number of objections of which the Centre was able to take cognizance, and not on the total number of objections.

The monitoring team also observed that the court staff receiving appeal claims were not well prepared or trained to deal with this type of claim; complaints reached the Centre concerning the difference in requirements as to annexes and particulars from one court to another.

The conduct of the determination of judicial appeals

During the period extending from 14 to 23/9/2010 the courts of first instance considered and determined the appeals submitted by citizens against the decisions of the Civil Status and Passports Department concerning the applications and objections submitted to it against the voters' rolls. The total number of appeals — as announced by the director of the technical office of the Court of Cassation — was 443 appeals distributed among the various governorates and districts, save for Aqaba Governorate in which no appeal was lodged. The outcomes of the appeals were as set out in Table No. (5):

Table No. (5): Number of appeals submitted to the competent courts and the decisions issued in respect thereof

Place	No. of cases	Dismissed	Set aside	Upheld	Set aside and upheld	Struck out	Dismissed on formal grounds	Referred	Adjudicated
Irbid	30	17	13						
Amman	67	20	25	10	4	1	5	1	1
Zarqa	30	6	14	10					
Balqa / Salt	171	159	12						
Mafraq	34	5	22	6		1			
Karak	33	2	4	27					
Ajloun	9	0	3	6					
Jerash	11	3	7	1					
Ma'an	54	1			50	3			
Madaba	2	1		1					
Tafilah	2		2						
Total	443	214	102	61	54	5	5	1	1

Upon studying these figures it is observed that the proportion of dismissals and dismissals on formal grounds by the courts was high, approaching 50% — which means that the courts did not enter into an examination of the substantive grounds relied upon by those lodging these appeals, their role being confined to examining the formal grounds, thereby depriving them of extending their supervision to the substantive merits of the grounds relied upon in these appeals. The high level of this proportion is attributable to the fact that the process of lodging appeals was not preceded by any awareness-raising for citizens, including specialists, as to the mechanisms and conditions for lodging appeals. The Centre records the inconsistency of the procedures relating to judicial appeal in the Elections Law with the purpose sought from judicial appeals, namely guaranteeing the right of citizens to participate in the elections — which requires that this right not be subject to any formal or legal requirements impeding its exercise, in addition to the necessity that these appeals be free of charge. This the legislator did not have regard to in the current Elections Law: the practical application of its provisions disclosed complexity in the procedures and a lack of smoothness

and ease, which contributed to the ineffectiveness of judicial appeal in strengthening the soundness of the electoral rolls.

The courts of first instance transmitted the results of the determination of the appeals to the Civil Status Department during the period from 25 to 27/9/2010, as provided in the Law. Thereafter, during the period from 28/9/2010 until 3/10/2010, the Civil Status and General Passports Department amended the voters' rolls in accordance with the decisions of the competent courts; it then furnished the administrative governors, during the period 4–6/10/2010, with the final voters' rolls. The administrative governors, however, did not publish the voters' rolls after they had acquired final status, whether electronically or in paper form, notwithstanding that the Ministry of the Interior had published the preliminary voters' rolls and the names of those objected to before the Civil Status Department on the Ministry's website. Although there is no provision in the current Elections Law obliging the Ministry of the Interior to publish the final lists of the voters' rolls — which indicates a legislative deficiency — the Centre is nevertheless of the view that the failure of the administrative governors to publish the voters' rolls after they had acquired final status, so as to enable the body of voters and candidates to inspect them and to verify their soundness, is inconsistent with one of the fundamental elements of the transparency of the electoral process recognized internationally, namely the furnishing of political parties, candidates, civil society organizations and voters with the electoral rolls in their final form.

The Centre published a statement in this regard and formally addressed the Minister of the Interior to publish the final rolls; a formal delegation from the Centre also visited the Ministry of the Interior and demanded the publication of the final rolls after they had acquired final status. Thereupon the Ministry of the Interior confined itself to publishing the final voters' rolls on the Ministry's website on 23/10/2010. It should be mentioned that these rolls did not include the names of persons who had not attended the Civil Status Department to receive their personal cards endorsed with the electoral district to which they had been transferred, whether by decision of the Civil Status Department or by judicial decision as a result of the objections and appeals lodged by citizens, and whose number amounted according to official estimates to approximately 150 thousand citizens — on the pretext of the fear that these persons might vote more than once. This constituted a manifest violation of the Elections Law, which treated the voters' rolls in this case as final and did not permit the deletion or addition of the name of any citizen thereto.

Seventh: Monitoring the stage and conduct of nomination for membership of the House of Representatives, and the judicial appeals and their conduct

The right to stand for election is the other face of the right to vote, given that voting and nomination are two complementary rights, parliamentary life not being possible with one without the other. For this reason the Jordanian Constitution, like the international human rights covenants, was careful to guarantee the right to stand for election as a sacred political and human right that may not be prejudiced or curtailed. Any law must guarantee the right of all citizens to participate in the conduct of public affairs by standing for membership of the representative councils, subject to reasonable restrictions, and in a manner ensuring that all those wishing to participate in the conduct of public affairs are afforded the opportunity to come forward for this task within those conditions that render the right to vote a right available to all voters.

In this framework the Jordanian Constitution laid down a set of conditions for nomination, set out in Article 75 thereof, which were reproduced in Provisional Elections Law No. (9) of 2010. The Centre nevertheless criticizes the Provisional Elections Law in this respect for contravening Article (75)(1)(e) of the Constitution, as previously mentioned, which provides that no person who has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding one year for a non-political offence and who has not been pardoned may be a member of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The text was framed in absolute terms as to the form of pardon and did not confine it to a general or a special pardon, whereas the Elections Law qualified the pardon by confining it to a general pardon to the exclusion of a special pardon.

1. Monitoring the stage of candidate registration

Observations on the conduct of the nomination process

The National Team monitored the nomination stage for the parliamentary elections of 2010, which continued for three days during the period between 10 and 12/10/2010. In this framework the observers of the National Team noted the cooperation of the committees concerned with them and the provision of such facilities as were possible. The Team recorded the following as regards the conduct of the nomination process:

- a. The process of accepting nomination applications began in all electoral districts from the commencement of official working hours on Sunday 10 October 2010; there was no suspension of the registration process during official working hours, nor were any nomination applications accepted after the end of official working hours.
- b. The nomination instructions were placed in a prominent position and in clear script, and were explained to persons wishing to stand for election by the district governor and the competent official.
- c. The staff charged with receiving nomination applications were careful to request the supporting documents from the candidate and to scrutinize them fully, which confirmed their familiarity with the registration procedures and the conditions that must be satisfied by the candidate.

The number of candidates for membership of the House of Representatives amounted to (854) candidates, of whom (142) were women, according to what was published by the chairpersons of the central committees in the daily newspapers on 16/10/2010. All nomination applications were accepted save for five in the Amman and Irbid Governorates. A number of candidates successively withdrew until 1/11/2010, so that the final number of candidates amounted to 763 candidates. The candidates were distributed among the electoral districts and the sub-districts as set out in Table No. (6):

Table No. (6): Number of candidates distributed by sub-district

City	Main district	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	Total
Amman	First	4	3	7	7	13			34
Amman	Second	4	5	7	9	6			31
Amman	Third	6	9	5	7	7			34
Amman	Fourth	6	9	3					18
Amman	Fifth	7	6	4					17
Amman	Sixth	9	6	2					17
Amman	Seventh	7							7
	Central Badia	5	8	8					21
Irbid	First	7	5	3	15	5			35
Irbid	Second	3	17	5					25
Irbid	Third	7							7
Irbid	Fourth	3	8						11
Irbid	Fifth	7	12						19
Irbid	Sixth	20							20
Irbid	Seventh	5							5
Irbid	Eighth	6							6
Irbid	Ninth	8							8
Balqa	First	5	10	4	6	4	9	3	41
Balqa	Second	9							9
Balqa	Third	11							11
Balqa	Fourth	15							15
Karak	First	8	11	4					23
Karak	Second	8	4						12
Karak	Third	5	6						11
Karak	Fourth	13							13
Karak	Fifth	13							13

City	Main district	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	Total
Karak	Sixth	11							11
Ma'an	First	5	5						10
Ma'an	Second	7							7
Ma'an	Third	4							4
	Southern Badia	3	7	5					15
Zarqa	First	9	7	11	2	6			35
Zarqa	Second	6	9	10					25
Zarqa	Third	7							7
Zarqa	Fourth	9	9						18
Ma'raq	First	6	4	5	7				22
	Northern Badia	4	6	8					18
Tafilah	First	3	2	4					9
Tafilah	Second	10							10
Madaba	First	13	7	8					28
Madaba	Second	10							10
Jerash	First	7	7	7	7				28
Ajloun	First	8	8	7					23
Ajloun	Second	6							6
Aqaba	First	6	8						14
Total									763

The table discloses a considerable disparity between the numbers of candidates from one sub-district to another: the lowest was two candidates in the Fourth Sub-District of the First Electoral District in Zarqa Governorate and in the Third Sub-District of the Sixth Electoral District in the Capital Governorate, while the highest was 22 candidates in the First Sub-District of the Sixth Electoral District in Irbid Governorate.

Upon comparing the numbers of candidates for the elections in 2010 with the numbers of candidates for the elections of 2007, it appears that there was a decline in the numbers of candidates for 2010 of 14% as against 2007, notwithstanding the increase in the number of seats from 110 to 120 seats. As regards the comparison of the numbers of female candidates for 2010 with the elections of 2007, a decline in the proportion of female candidates of 28% as against 2007 was observed, notwithstanding the rise in the number of seats allocated to women to 12 seats. It is also noted that the list of candidates' names in the Southern Badia district was devoid of any female candidate — which calls for an inquiry into the reasons for this tendency to withdraw.

By contrast, the National Team observed a number of criticisms that impeded the conduct of the nomination process, the most prominent of them being:

- a. The failure of the central committees to publish the names of those who had submitted nomination applications in the sub-districts for which they stood, confining themselves to the preliminary announcement of the number of candidates at the end of each day of nomination; likewise the refusal of the central committees to furnish candidates with the names of persons who had preceded them in nomination in the sub-districts — a matter that aroused the anxiety of voters and candidates alike, out of fear of the possibility of one of them winning by acclamation, or of winning in a manner akin to acclamation, where it was known that the number of his voters was greater than the number of the voters of his competitors in the same sub-district. This secrecy was accompanied by the absence of any tangible measures on the part of the Government to ensure that no information concerning the sub-districts was leaked; certain candidates, however, stated that they had been able to see the lists of candidates before registering their nomination applications, which led some persons wishing to stand for election to delay their nomination for the sub-districts until the final hour of the process, and led a large number of candidates to follow the registration process in the notional sub-districts, whether through their direct presence at the Governorate building or by sending their delegates who would inform them who had registered and where. It should be noted that the daily newspapers reported news from political and governmental sources confirming that the Elections Law does not oblige the Governor to announce the names of candidates in the sub-districts during the registration process, and that the Law likewise does not prevent the Governor from announcing the names, since they are not secret. It should further be noted that the committees would caution candidates as to the necessity of not announcing their sub-districts, notwithstanding that the Government had expressly announced in the media that it would publish the names of the candidates in the sub-districts promptly. Most candidates complained of the secrecy surrounding the subject of the sub-districts and of the ambiguity of the law concerning them, and specifically as to what would happen if no one registered in a sub-district.

The Centre is of the view that the Government's failure to disclose the names of the candidates of the sub-districts promptly is inconsistent with the principle of the public character of nomination, which aims to protect the competitiveness and transparency of the nomination process. It likewise contradicts the principle of equality among candidates in obtaining equal opportunities of access to parliamentary seats — which partly explains the considerable disparity in the number of candidates in the sub-districts — and is inconsistent with the right of the candidate and the voter to obtain information relating to the names of the candidates in the sub-districts, particularly as the form of the sub-districts permits the distribution of parliamentary seats among strong candidates in a manner closer to acclamation than to free and honest competition. It is worth mentioning that certain candidates expressed their dissatisfaction at the existence of an agreement among the strong candidates to apportion the sub-districts among themselves; one candidate also objected to the lack of fairness in the division of districts by comparison with the numbers of the population resident in them.

- b. The candidates in the Fourth District in Balqa Governorate protested at the delay of the central committee in disclosing the results of the acceptance or rejection of the nomination results on the third day from the submission of applications.

- c. The monitoring team received a complaint from one of the candidates against the central committee in the Capital Governorate to the effect that there was discrimination in the treatment of candidates, in that one of those wishing to stand for election was received directly in the Governor's office and did not pass through the procedures undergone by the remaining persons wishing to stand for election.
- d. The Centre received two complaints from candidates concerning the levying by the Greater Amman Municipality of sums of money in cash to guarantee the proper conduct of the publicity campaign and the removal of banners within two weeks from the date of the conclusion of the elections. The Greater Amman Municipality denied this and affirmed its compliance with the conditions and instructions on the use of electoral campaigning, which afforded candidates the right to pay the sum in cash or by cheque.
- e. Three candidates objected to the multiplicity of bodies that had to be attended in order to obtain the documents annexed to the nomination application. One of them stated to the monitoring team that obtaining a certificate of no criminal record had taken a long time, and another complained of difficulties in obtaining a document evidencing nationality. Three others objected to the fact that the payment of fees and registration did not take place in a single location.
- f. Three candidates demanded a single central committee for the issue of the documents necessary for nomination; one candidate demanded that a person be permitted to be authorized to act in place of the candidate and on his behalf in registering him as a candidate; two candidates demanded that registration be electronic via the internet; and one candidate objected to the centralization of registration, demanding that registration also be possible at the district centres.

2. Monitoring the stage of judicial appeals in the nomination process

The National Team for monitoring the electoral process followed the stage of appeals by candidates against the decisions of the central committees rejecting their nomination, as from Saturday 16/10/2010 and for a period of three days. The Team likewise followed the courts' examination and determination of the appeals during three days ending on 21/10/2010.

The Team recorded that five persons wishing to stand for election lodged five judicial appeals against the decisions of the central committees in Amman and Irbid, which had given as the reason for the rejection of their nomination applications either the issue of a judicial sentence of imprisonment for a period exceeding one year on account of the commission of a non-political offence, or nomination outside the electoral district allocated to the Circassians and Chechens under Districts Division Regulation No. (26) of 2010. Judgments were issued dismissing all the appeals, save for the appeal lodged by one of the candidates before the South Amman Court, where the Court decided to set aside the decision of the central committee and to accept his nomination. It should be noted that the reason for the central committee's rejection of this candidate's application was the issue of a judgment against him for the misdemeanour of breach of trust.

It should be mentioned that two contradictory judgments were issued by two courts of first instance in respect of the same offence: the appeal lodged by one candidate was allowed notwithstanding the objection of the central committee on account of his previous conviction for the offence of breach of trust, whereas

the application of the other candidate was dismissed — a matter that requires that the judicial process be of two tiers as regards candidates' appeals against the decisions of the central committees.

The National Team also followed the appeals by voters against the acceptance of the nomination applications of candidates for membership of the Sixteenth House of Representatives, which began on Saturday 23/10/2010 for a period of three days, after lists of their names had been published in the local newspapers on Friday 22/10/2010. The courts furnished their decisions to the central committees so that the lists of candidates might become final and conclusive.

The National Team recorded the lodging of eleven judicial appeals against the acceptance of the nomination of eight candidates in the Capital Governorate and three candidates in Irbid Governorate. The grounds of the appeals were confined to five principal grounds, namely:

- a. The existence of candidates sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding one year for a non-political offence who had not been pardoned.
- b. The existence of a candidate suffering from a psychiatric illness.
- c. The dual nationality of certain candidates.
- d. The existence of a pecuniary interest with one of the government departments by reason of a contract other than contracts of lease and property.
- e. That the former deputies who were currently candidates were not worthy of trust, and that this was why the House of which they had been members had been dissolved.

The courts dismissed all these appeals. In breach of the Elections Law, the Centre recorded the failure of the chairpersons of the central committees to announce the final lists of candidates after the courts of appeal had issued their decisions on the appeals by voters against the acceptance of candidates, given that the Elections Law provided in Article 13(e) for the necessity of doing so as a formal condition for the list of candidates acquiring final status.

Eighth: Monitoring the conduct of electoral campaigning

Electoral campaigning began before the date fixed for it in law under Article 17(1) of the Elections Law, which permitted candidates to conduct electoral campaigning as from the date of acceptance of nomination until the end of the day preceding polling day; the electoral administration did not take legal measures against those in breach in most of these cases.²¹ It was likewise observed that electoral campaigning continued until polling day, in manifest breach of Article 17(a) of the Elections Law. The National Team monitored breaches of Article 17(5) of the Elections Law during the electoral process, which obliged candidates to refrain from attacking other candidates in their electoral campaigning, whether personally or through their agents; breaches of Article 17(3) of the Elections Law, which obliged the candidate, in conducting electoral campaigning, to preserve national unity and the security and stability of the homeland and to refrain from discriminating among citizens; and breaches of Article 18(d) of the same Law, which indicated that speeches, statements, advertisements and means of electoral campaigning may not contain any prejudice to any other candidate, directly or indirectly. Among the most important of these breaches monitored by the Team are the following:

- a. The abuse by certain candidates of other candidates, their defamation and the levelling of accusations against them by distributing leaflets disparaging them among the public, as occurred in Madaba Governorate; and the distribution on a wide scale among voters of the appeal submitted to the court of first instance concerning the validity of the nomination application of one person, by reason of its containing moral accusations against the person objected to.
- b. Assaults upon electoral publicity in the public streets by tearing it, drawing upon it offensively, or placing obscene expressions on the photographs of certain candidates, as occurred in the Third District in the Capital Governorate, where one of the candidates was depicted as feeding upon the blood of the people.
- c. The holding of election-related meetings at the premises of charitable associations.
- d. The firing of shots and fireworks during candidates' processions and the opening of campaign headquarters in the Seventh District in the Capital and the Second District in Balqa Governorate, which resulted in injury to certain persons. The Centre also monitored the spread of the phenomenon of mobilizing attendance at the opening of campaign headquarters by paying sums of money to attendees.
- e. The conduct by one satellite channel of an electronic vote to determine those expected to win the elections in order to achieve financial gains — a matter that aroused the dissatisfaction of candidates out of fear of the effect of these results upon voters' convictions and orientations, and of the social tensions that might result from this in certain governorates.
- f. An attempt by a person in Madaba Governorate to exploit the reputation of a prominent academic centre at a government university in order to influence citizens' choices, and his claim that this centre had

²¹ The figures and percentages set out in this table may differ from the official figures and percentages, being based on the reports and on the information furnished to the National Monitoring Team by the civil status offices.

published a study measuring the chances of certain candidates winning the parliamentary elections in that governorate, in an attempt on his part to influence voters' electoral choices.

- g. The use by one of the candidates of the Sixth District in the Capital Governorate of a group of children at his campaign headquarters to distribute his electoral publicity, contrary to international standards and to Jordan's commitments concerning child labour, and in breach of the Labour Law as well.
- h. The assault by unknown persons upon two candidates, one in Balqa Governorate and the other in Madaba Governorate.
- i. The use by certain candidates of expressions from the slogans broadcast by the Government to urge citizens to register and to vote, in an attempt on their part to portray themselves as loyal to the Government.

It was likewise monitored that the municipalities failed to designate places for the display of electoral publicity in most of the governorates, which led to its haphazard spread and disfigured certain private property of citizens — in particular the placing of electoral publicity on traffic signals and signs, which obstructed the view of vehicles owing to its density in certain areas and in the public streets. It should be noted that the National Team monitored the affixing of the photographs of certain candidates to lighting poles in front of the building of the Greater Amman Municipality in the Khalda area without any measure being taken to remove them, notwithstanding their breach of the law; by contrast, the Team monitored the removal by the Amman Municipality of certain infringing electoral publicity in Wadi Safra.

Among the regrettable matters witnessed during the electoral campaigning period was the aggravation of the phenomenon of vote-buying as part of the electoral campaigns of candidates. Vote-buying operations began from the moment of the announcement of the date of the parliamentary elections, and the price of a single vote ranged between 25 dinars and 200 dinars.²² During these elections the phenomenon of vote-buying took a new form, represented in what is termed the "freezing of votes", that is, the retention of personal cards in return for a sum of money paid to the voter, whether by the candidate or by his agents, so as to deprive competitors of obtaining the vote of the holder of that card.

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The Centre received two complaints: the first to the effect that one of the candidates had exploited the funds of a charitable association in his electoral campaign and directed the assistance it provides to particular families in order that they vote for him. The second was submitted by one of the candidates in the Third District in the Capital Governorate concerning a threat by the Amman Municipality to remove his campaign materials so long as he did not pay a sum of 4,000 dinars in cash; the Municipality, however, denied those

²² It is certain that the more accurate figure is that received from the courts, namely (443); this table may nevertheless be relied upon in order to ascertain the distribution of appeals by governorate, three appeals being unclassified according to the Centre's information.

²³ Madaba Governorate witnessed manifest electoral campaigning in the streets and public places before the date fixed therefor. The Centre addressed the Ministry of the Interior to take the necessary measures for its removal, and the Ministry responded to this communication by removing most of the electoral publicity, save for one electoral banner indicating the campaign headquarters of one of the persons wishing to stand for election at the Greena triangle. It should also be noted that some of this publicity was removed in Irbid and Zarqa Governorates by the administrative governors.

allegations and stated that it accepts cheques from candidates in this regard — which the Centre verified by reference to the instructions regulating electoral campaigning.

Among the matters the Centre regrets is the failure of the Government to take any serious measure to punish those in breach of the provisions governing electoral campaigning set out in the Elections Law while candidates and their delegates were engaged in such campaigning.

Ninth: Monitoring the conduct of polling and counting day

1. The commencement of the polling operation and the opening of the polling centres

Election day began at precisely seven o'clock in the morning, the observers of the National Team proceeding to the ballot boxes allocated to each of them. The proportion of ballot boxes subjected to monitoring by the National Team was approximately 30% of the overall total of ballot boxes, numbering (4,220) boxes. All observers were permitted to follow the commencement of the polling operation without any restrictions being imposed upon them, save for (39) observers — that is 3.53% — who were not permitted to attend the opening operation by reason of the refusal of the chairpersons of the polling and counting committees to admit them to the polling centres.²⁴ The monitoring team recorded its observations and findings concerning this process as follows:

- a. That 35.24% of the observers indicated the absence of any guidance signs directing to the locations of the electoral centres, and that polling guidance was not available at 30.23% of these centres. A shortage in the number of ballot boxes allocated for polling in certain villages by comparison with their population was also monitored, and a complaint reached the Centre concerning the existence of only one ballot box at the Ras Munif School in the First District in Ajloun Governorate, notwithstanding that the number of voters in that village reached 2,000 voters. In addition, 6.31% of the observers indicated difficulty in reaching the polling and counting centres. These matters taken together may have contributed to limiting citizens' exercise of their constitutional right to participate in the electoral process.
- b. The observers indicated that 71.4% of the polling and counting centres monitored were not equipped to receive voters among persons with disabilities. For example, persons with disabilities voted on the second floor of the building of the Quweisma School polling centre in the Capital Governorate and of the Rakin Secondary School for Girls polling centre in Karak Governorate. Likewise, there was no ballot box for persons with disabilities at the Al-Mughayyir Comprehensive Secondary School polling centre in the First District in Irbid Governorate, notwithstanding that it had been designated for polling by persons with disabilities — a matter that may have limited the exercise by this social segment of its constitutional right to participate in the electoral process. Table No. (7) sets out the factors that affected the participation of this category of citizens according to the proportions monitored by the National Team.

Table No. (7): Factors that affected the participation of persons with disabilities in polling

²⁴ The monitoring team recorded that more than one candidate in the Third District/Amman conducted a large vote-buying campaign. The Team also recorded that one of the candidates of the Third District/Amman purchased a large number of votes, in addition to offering a sum of 30,000 dinars to a supporter of another candidate in the same district in return for bringing him votes belonging to that candidate, at the rate of 100 dinars per vote. The newspaper Al-Arab Al-Yawm published a detailed report on this subject entitled "In meetings documented in sound and image, (Al-Arab Al-Yawm) uncovers the buying and selling of electoral votes", published on 7/11/2010.

No.	Factor	Percentage according to monitoring
1	Absence of a ramp specific to persons with mobility impairments	42.42%
2	The polling centre not being on the ground floor	29.41%
3	Absence of a lift	76.92%
4	Absence of a sign-language interpreter	66.67%
5	Unsuitability of the table in the booth and of the table on which the ballot box is placed	19.35%

- c. Polling commenced at approximately 95% of the centres monitored at approximately the time specified, whereas the commencement of polling was delayed at approximately 5% of the centres monitored beyond seven o'clock in the morning — a matter that prevented numbers of citizens who had queued for the purposes of polling from casting their votes at that time. By way of example, the National Team monitored delay in the polling operation at the Khawla bint Al-Azwar Mixed Secondary School in the Fourth District in the Capital, the Hammoud Comprehensive Secondary School for Boys in the Second District in Karak Governorate, the Bayt Ras Basic School for Girls in the First District in Irbid Governorate, and the Umm Batma Comprehensive Secondary School for Boys polling centre in the Central Badia district, owing to server and electronic network failures. The opening of the ballot box was also delayed beyond the specified time owing to the late arrival of committee members at the King Hussein Secondary School for Boys polling centre in the First District in Irbid Governorate; the opening of the ballot box at the Subhiyya Mixed Basic School polling centre in the Northern Badia district was delayed owing to the absence of a data-entry operator on the committee; and the opening of the ballot box at the May Ziadeh Mixed Basic School polling centre in the Fifth District in the Capital was delayed owing to the absence of any of the candidates' delegates.²⁵
- d. The monitoring team recorded the failure of two election committees to abide by the numbers of the ballot boxes allocated to them as announced by the election committees.
- e. The existence of candidates' campaign materials was observed at approximately 8.69% of the buildings of the polling centres monitored, and the official authorities did not act to prevent the presence of these materials pursuant to the provisions of the law at 35.29% of the buildings in which such publicity for candidates was found — a matter constituting a breach of Article 17(b)(4) of the Elections Law, which prohibited the conduct of electoral campaigning in these buildings, and of Article 17(a) of the Elections Law, which required the cessation of all forms of electoral campaigning at the end of the day preceding polling day with the object of preventing its influence upon voters when casting their votes; in addition to being a manifest breach of Article 29 of the Elections Law, which required the chairperson of the polling and counting committee to prevent any person from performing any act calculated to influence the proper conduct of the electoral process — quite apart from being

²⁵ The monitoring team recorded clear indications that one of the candidates of the Second District/the Capital had frozen identity cards with the assistance of his agents, a sum of 25 or 30 dinars being paid for each identity card obtained, in return for its remaining with him until the conclusion of the polling operation. One female candidate of the Third District likewise visited a number of homes and paid a sum of 35 dinars in return for retaining identity cards. Information also reached the Centre indicating that sums of money had been paid to the staff of a private hospital near the headquarters of one of the candidates in the Third District in order that they vote for him, their identity cards being retained by him.

inconsistent with international best practice guaranteeing the integrity of elections. Examples of this are what the National Team monitored by way of the continuation of electoral campaigning and of gatherings in front of the polling centres; certain delegates asking voters to vote for a particular candidate at the polling centres and using their personal telephones inside these centres, including the Al-Karama Mixed Basic School polling centre in Balqa Governorate; the distribution of candidates' leaflets in front of polling centres, including the Al-Muhallab bin Abi Sufra School in the First District in Zarqa Governorate; the organization of rallies chanting the name of one of the candidates at the centres, including the Al-Mughayyir Comprehensive Secondary School for Girls polling centre in the First District in Irbid Governorate; and the distribution of water cups bearing the photograph of one of the candidates at the Katm Comprehensive Secondary School for Boys polling centre in the Second District in Irbid Governorate.

- f. 26.35% of the observers recorded the presence of persons other than the members of the polling and counting committee, the candidates, their delegates and the observers at the centres monitored while citizens were exercising the right to vote — which constitutes a breach of Articles 26 and 35 of the Elections Law, which set out the composition of the polling and counting committees and the tasks entrusted to them. The observers stated that these persons were most probably from the security agencies, by reason of their carrying communication devices used by those agencies, in addition to other persons conducting periodic rounds inside the polling halls. A photographer also entered with the Mayor of Amman and the chairperson of the committee permitted him to remain inside the centre at the Mayor's request, at the Jordan University College for Hotel and Tourism Education polling centre in the Third District in the Capital.
- g. Notwithstanding the provision by the electoral administration of ballot papers, ballot boxes and lists of candidates' names²⁶ at the polling place at approximately 98.67%, 99.02% and 97.32% respectively,
- h. The monitoring team affirmed that the specifications of the ballot boxes accord with international best practice in this field as regards the transparency of the box and the manner of its closure, notwithstanding the failure of the Minister of the Interior to issue the instructions determining the form and specifications of the ballot box in accordance with Article 31 of the Elections Law — which confirms the soundness of the criticism directed by the National Centre for Human Rights at the current Law, which grants the Minister of the Interior the power to determine the form of the ballot box, and the soundness of the Centre's recommendation that the Law itself contain the specifications and form of the box.²⁷ Nevertheless, 20.84% of the observers noted that the aperture of the boxes was

²⁶ The chairman of the central elections committee in Jerash Governorate did not permit observers to enter the polling centres at seven o'clock in the morning carrying their mobile telephones, on the pretext that this would lead candidates' delegates and the remaining monitoring teams to demand entry to the centres carrying their mobile telephones. Observers in the Southern Badia district were likewise prevented from entering two polling centres (Prince Mohammad Military School and Al-Husseiniya Secondary School for Boys) for half an hour; an observer was not permitted to enter a polling and counting centre in Zarqa Governorate, and likewise at the Dhiban Mixed Basic School polling centre in the Second District – Madaba; and an observer was prevented from entering by police personnel at Aqraba Secondary School for Boys, Fifth District – Irbid Governorate, thereby depriving them of monitoring the commencement of polling. In addition, during the monitoring of polling day one member of the National Team for monitoring the conduct of the electoral process was detained for four consecutive hours by the Deputy Governor of Balqa, and two members of the Team in Jerash Governorate were expelled by a committee chairperson (Al-Rashayda Basic School for Girls) and the observer was not admitted.

²⁷ By way of example, the names of three candidates did not appear in the list of candidates' names at the Safana bint Hatim Al-Ta'i Basic School polling centre in the Second District in the Capital.

wide enough to insert more than one ballot paper at the same time; the National Team monitored more than one voter placing more than one paper in the same box, as occurred at the Hatimiyyat Al-Muwaqqar School for Girls in the Central Badia district. The observers also stated that 2.43% of the boxes monitored were not in a place permitting the insertion of the ballot paper into them to be observed — a matter that impeded the role of candidates' delegates and observers in monitoring the polling operation fully.

- i. 98.04% of the observers recorded the existence of one booth for each ballot box in a manner achieving the privacy of voters. Credit is due to the electoral administration for the considerable progress achieved in this field, represented in the improvement of the conditions of the booth by placing a curtain on each booth, which contributed to achieving privacy for the voter while writing the name of the candidate for whom he wished to vote.
- j. The polling and counting committees in 29.44% of the boxes monitored did not count the ballot papers in the presence of those attending before the commencement of the polling operation, as occurred at all polling centres in Zarqa Governorate and at five polling centres in the Capital Governorate; and the number of ballot papers was not announced in the presence of those attending in 28.57% of the boxes monitored — a matter that discloses the failure of a large proportion of the polling and counting committees to comply with the instructions issued by the Ministry of the Interior in this regard, since the Polling and Counting Procedures Manual emphasized the necessity that the chairperson of each committee count the ballot papers received by him and announce the total number so that the candidates' delegates and observers might record the number of these papers, in addition to the necessity that the chairperson of the committee record the number of these papers in the record of the commencement of polling. It should be noted that the current Elections Law did not provide for the necessity of counting the ballot papers before commencing the polling operation — a matter that discloses a deficiency in the Elections Law of 2010 and renders futile the counting of the papers used in polling and of those not used or cancelled or destroyed (provided for in Article 38 of the Elections Law), thereby leaving no scope for observers and candidates' delegates to verify the propriety of the work of the polling committees in a manner guaranteeing the integrity of the polling and counting procedures.
- k. It was observed that 2.30% of the counting and polling committees in the boxes monitored did not display the ballot boxes to the candidates' delegates at the commencement of the polling operation in order to verify that they were empty of any papers, contrary to Article 32 of the Elections Law, which specified the procedures to be followed by the chairperson of the polling and counting committee before the commencement of the polling operation.
- l. As regards the preparation of the record of the commencement of polling, the monitoring team recorded the failure to prepare this record at 2.76% of the centres monitored; the number of ballot papers was not entered in this record at 21.05% of the centres monitored as well; and those attending among the candidates and their delegates were not permitted to sign the record of the commencement of polling at 5.15% of them — which means the failure of a number of the polling and counting committees to abide by the instructions relating to the procedures for opening the ballot boxes and commencing the

polling operation issued by the Ministry of the Interior, requiring the chairperson of the committee to invite the candidates' delegates to sign the record. That was a step to make good the deficiency in Article 32 of the Elections Law, which required the drawing up of a record of the commencement of the polling operation and its signature by all members of the committee in the presence of the candidates.

The polling and counting committees responded to 36.01% of these complaints, and a measure was taken in 32.94% of them. It should be mentioned that the Elections Law did not regulate the mechanism for submitting complaints and objections to the polling and counting committee and omitted the requirement that they be in writing — which prompted the Ministry of the Interior to attempt to remedy this deficiency and to issue instructions addressing it on the one hand, and disclosed the inconsistency of the Elections Law with the international standards for free and honest elections on the other, which requires that this deficiency be avoided when the Elections Law is discussed by the National Assembly.

m. The Team monitored the spread of disorder inside certain polling centres and in their vicinity for various reasons, among them:

1. The slowness of the procedures for documenting the names of voters, which led to delay in the polling operation and to overcrowding of voters inside the centres.
2. The existence of objections to the withholding of voters' identity cards, as occurred at the Dahiya Basic School for Girls in the First District.
3. The breakdown of the electronic network at certain centres, which led to delay in the opening of the Tafilah Vocational Secondary School for Boys polling centre in the First District in Tafilah Governorate and of the Princess Rahma bint Al-Hassan Basic School for Girls polling centre in the Third District in the Capital Governorate, resulting in overcrowding of voters.
4. The gathering of the supporters of certain candidates near certain polling centres and their chanting for their candidates in a loud voice.

2. Monitoring the procedures specific to polling

The monitoring team followed the polling procedures in the boxes monitored during polling day, and recorded the following observations:

- a. The polling and counting committees at the polling centres monitored verified the identity of the voter at 98.88% of the centres monitored,²⁸ consistently with Article 35(a) of the Elections Law, which required the chairperson of the polling and counting committee to do so on the basis specifically of the personal civil status card issued by the Civil Status Department and endorsed with the electoral district.
- b. The polling and counting committees verified the presence of the voter's name in the voters' roll for the district to which the polling centre belongs by reviewing the presence of the voter's name on the

²⁸ By way of example, the number of ballot papers in the box at the Ajnadin Basic School polling centre in the First District in Irbid Governorate was 750 papers instead of the specified number of 1,000.

records of the committee's computer, at a rate of 97.95% of the centres monitored.²⁹ 6,756 cases were nevertheless recorded in which it was not verified that the voter's name was present in the voters' roll on the computer. In addition, the observers verified in 88.24% of cases the marking of the voter's name on the computer after verifying the presence of his name in the voters' rolls, whereas the observers were unable in 11.76% of the centres monitored to verify this. The committee likewise recorded the name of the voter and his national number in the roll specific to those who had cast their votes at 98.86% of the centres monitored. By contrast, 9,380 cases were monitored in which the name of the voter and his national number were not recorded in the roll of those who had cast their votes.

- c. 943 voters were prevented from voting in their electoral districts in the boxes monitored by the Team on the pretext that their names did not appear on the electronic linking device, notwithstanding that their personal cards were endorsed with the electoral district. An example of this is the prevention of 10 voters from voting owing to the non-correspondence of the district number between the card and the computer at the Ibn Abbas Comprehensive Secondary School for Boys in the Fifth District in the Capital; 35 voters were likewise prevented for the same reason at the Dabouq Basic School for Girls in the Fifth District in the Capital. 867 persons were permitted to vote without their names being present in the electoral rolls, as occurred at the Anwar Nusseibeh Basic School for Boys polling centre in the Second District in Zarqa Governorate, the Jordan University College for Hotel and Tourism Education in the Third District in the Capital, and the Al-Amin Basic School for Boys polling centre and the Juwayriya Umm Al-Mu'minin Basic School for Girls in the Fifth District in the Capital. The Team monitored a disparity in the practices of the polling and counting committees in dealing with voters whose identity cards were not endorsed with the electoral district: certain committees permitted some voters to vote if the electoral district appeared on the computer notwithstanding that it was not endorsed on the identity card. The Team monitored in the Fourth District in Balqa Governorate and in the Fifth District in the Capital Governorate the requiring of voters whose identity cards did not bear the electoral district to attend the district governor in order to be granted permits to exercise their right to vote, contrary to law; certain voters complained that the district governor had granted permits to some voters to the exclusion of others. The Centre affirms that such conduct constitutes discrimination among voters and a manifest breach of the integrity of the electoral process. The monitoring team likewise recorded the occurrence of 260 cases of collective voting, consisting of the entry of more than one voter at the same time without any objection on the part of the polling committee — as occurred at the Ain Al-Basha Secondary School for Girls polling centre in the Fourth District in Balqa Governorate, when three voters entered the polling booth more than once; the presence of five female voters around the ballot box at the Queen Zein Al-Sharaf Secondary School for Girls polling centre in the Third District in the Capital; and the voting of more than one person at the same time at the ballot box of the Madaba Industrial Comprehensive Secondary School for Boys in the First District in Madaba Governorate. Notwithstanding the small numbers of collective voting, these represent conduct inconsistent with the principle of the secrecy of the ballot enshrined in the

²⁹ The size of the ballot box must be proportionate to the number of voters; the width of the aperture of the ballot box must be designed so as to be proportionate to the size of the ballot paper; the boxes must be transparent and light in weight; it must be ensured that the box cannot be opened without breaking the locks and seals; and the boxes must be clearly sealed by the electoral administration so that the opening of the box is detected if the seal is damaged.

Constitution, the international covenants and the Elections Law, all of which have treated the principle of the secrecy of the ballot as one of the standards of the integrity and transparency of elections.

- d. The observers confirmed that 46.95% of the ballot papers had been stamped and signed in advance, contrary to the instructions of the Ministry of the Interior, which required the chairperson of the polling committee to sign the ballot paper in the presence of the voters — a matter that requires the Elections Law to specify the necessity of stamping and signing the ballot paper in the presence of the members of the committee and of those attending among the candidates, their delegates and the observers.
- e. Persons other than members of the polling committee in the Central Badia district obtained ballot papers, some of them signed by one of the chairpersons of committees in the same district, and were stamping them outside the polling centre and asking other persons to take them to polling centres. The Team also monitored at the Fawzi Al-Mulqi Secondary School for Boys in Mafraq Governorate, during the counting operation, the existence of ballot papers in bundles bearing the name of one of the candidates of the Qasabat Al-Mafraq district notwithstanding that they were stamped with the seal of the Northern Badia district; and the Centre monitored the circulation of stamped ballot papers in the First District in Balqa Governorate.
- f. The polling committees at the centres monitored verified the identity of voters claiming illiteracy in 53,253 monitored cases; objection was made by those attending in 492 of these cases.
- g. The failure of a large number of voters to cast their votes secretly and their resort to what is known as open voting and the writing of the candidate's name outside the booth. This phenomenon was monitored at 98.39% of the centres monitored, as occurred at the Allan Secondary School for Boys polling centre and the Luwayha School polling centre in Balqa Governorate, the Hay Ulaymat Secondary School for Girls polling centre in Mafraq Governorate, the Anjara Secondary School for Boys polling centre in Ajloun Governorate, the Kafr Awan Mixed Comprehensive Secondary School polling centre in the Ninth District in Irbid Governorate, and the Hittin Mixed Basic School polling centre in the First District in Zarqa Governorate. The Team recorded voters displaying the ballot paper to the candidate's delegate after leaving the booth, and the failure of the polling and counting committees to take any measures to apply the provisions of the Elections Law penalizing this act, save for depriving 46 voters and impounding 709 personal civil status cards on account of the illiterate voter announcing in an audible voice the name of the candidate he wished to elect. This occurred at the Hind bint Abi Umayya School in the First District in Zarqa Governorate, at which it emerged that the chairperson of the committee did not know how to deal with the manner of voting by illiterate voters — a matter constituting a manifest breach of Article 67 of the Constitution and of Article 21 of the Elections Law, which provided that polling shall be general, secret and direct, in addition to its breach of Article 34(e) of the Elections Law, which required that the vote of an illiterate voter be by whisper such that only the chairperson and members of the polling committee hear it. This gives rise to suspicion of the buying of votes and the use of what is termed political money; regrettably, the

Government did not deal firmly with this phenomenon.³⁰ Examples of vote-buying are what occurred at the Fuheis Comprehensive School for Girls polling centre and the Fuheis Latin Basic School in the First District in Balqa Governorate, the Hind bint Abi Umayya School polling centre in the First District in Zarqa Governorate, the Jamil bin Shakir School polling centre in the Capital, and the Manshiyyat Al-Sulta Mixed Secondary School polling centre in the Northern Badia district. A number of supporters of one of the candidates in the Sixth District in the Capital were also arrested on a charge of buying votes. In addition, the Team monitored the photographing of a ballot paper by one of the voters after writing the name of the candidate on it at the Al-Mazar Basic School for Boys polling centre in the Third District in Irbid Governorate. The monitoring team also recorded in the Second District in the Capital Governorate, and specifically in the Al-Akhdar area (Hay Nazzal), the presence of a group of voters travelling in four buses, in one of which a woman was asking voters to swear upon the Qur'an to vote for one of the candidates and was granting them a sum of 40 dinars in return for the vote.

- h. Approximately 79% of voters folded the ballot paper before leaving the booth. Examples of voters writing the name of the candidate outside the booth are what occurred at the Ali Rida Al-Rikabi Basic School for Boys polling centre in the Fifth District in the Capital. 97.82% of the observers stated that the illiterate voter was careful to receive the ballot paper, fold it and place it in the box — which indicates the concern of voters for the principle of the secrecy of the ballot, notwithstanding that the Elections Law does not oblige a non-illiterate voter to fold the paper. This requires the legislator to affirm this sound practice in any future amendments to the Law.
- i. 95.22% of the observers indicated that a special roll of the names of illiterate voters had been prepared and their fingerprint or signature taken thereon. The polling committees likewise adhered to the method of whispering in a low voice by the illiterate voter to name the candidate he wished to elect, at a rate of 91%, and to the chairperson of the committee displaying the ballot paper, after writing the name of the candidate on it, to the members of the committee, at a rate of 90%.
- j. The Team recorded that the polling and counting committees took the measures specified by the Minister of the Interior concerning the clipping of the civil status card at its two ends so as to ensure that polling was not repeated, at 98.52% of the monitoring centres. Among the examples monitored by the National Team is the apprehension of one voter who attempted to vote for a second time and whose personal card was unclipped; he was referred for investigation at the Ajnadin Comprehensive Secondary School for Girls polling centre in the First District in Zarqa Governorate. The identity cards of those who voted were likewise not clipped at the Shihan Basic School polling centre in the Second District in Karak Governorate.
- k. It was observed at approximately 7% of the centres monitored that persons not authorized to enter the polling centres entered during the voting operation, most probably from the security agencies. The presence of Public Security personnel was likewise observed at approximately 8.79% of the centres

³⁰ A forged personal civil status card belonging to one person was seized at the Ja'far Al-Tayyar Basic School for Boys in Mafraq Governorate; the card was impounded and the person was referred to the security authorities. Two persons were likewise permitted to vote whose names appeared on the computer screen notwithstanding that the electoral district was not endorsed on their personal cards, at the Irbid Comprehensive Secondary School for Girls in the First District in Irbid Governorate.

inside the polling centres during voting without justification, as occurred at the Princess Basma Comprehensive Secondary School for Girls polling centre in the Fifth District in the Capital — it being noted that the chairperson of the committee cautioned them to leave the centres in 18.78% of these cases. This constituted a breach of the Elections Law, which entrusted to the polling and counting committee the task of guaranteeing the integrity of the electoral process pursuant to Articles 26 and 35 of the Elections Law.

- l. The National Team monitored the occurrence of attempts to obstruct the conduct of the polling operation at approximately 2% of the centres monitored, and the exposure of approximately 3% of the officials of the polling committees to abuse by voters — as occurred at the Al-Dulayla Basic School for Boys in the Central Badia district, when the chairperson of the committee was assaulted and its computers were smashed; one of the candidates also insulted the members of the committee at the Al-Majar Mixed Basic School polling centre in Jerash Governorate.
- m. The National Team monitored 158 cases in which persons impersonated others in order to vote in their place — as occurred when a female voter attempted to vote using an identity card other than her own at the Zabda Al-Wastiyya Mixed Basic School in the Eighth District in Irbid Governorate and was deprived of voting; a person likewise attempted to impersonate another person using his personal card at the Bayt Idis Comprehensive Secondary School for Boys in the Sixth District in Irbid Governorate, and likewise at the Wadi Al-Salt Mixed Basic School polling centres in the First District in Balqa Governorate, the Ghurandal Comprehensive Secondary School for Boys in the Second District in Tafilah Governorate, and at the Al-Zayna Basic School for Girls in Qasabat Al-Mafraq. The Team also monitored 45 cases in which voting took place more than once, as occurred at the Umm Al-Hakam Mixed Basic School polling centre in the First District in Ma'an Governorate.
- n. 268 objections were submitted concerning the acts of the polling committees and the conduct of voters during voting at the centres monitored; the committees responded to only 138 of these objections. The polling and counting committee or its chairperson or one of its members was changed during the polling operation at 11 of the centres monitored. Voting was likewise suspended 475 times for various reasons,³¹ and 7% of the observers indicated that those attending had protested against the suspension of voting operations without any response from the polling committees.
- o. As regards voting by persons with disabilities, the polling and counting committees at the centres monitored provided assistance to voters with disabilities and permitted their companions to assist them inside the polling centres at rates of 88.19% and 84.65% respectively. It emerged to the monitoring team, however, that most of the polling centres designated for persons with disabilities, numbering (255) centres, were not ready. Likewise, the companion did not write the name of the candidate dictated to him by the voter with a disability by whisper inside the booth and away from the sight and hearing of the committee and those attending, at a rate of 34.62%; and the voter with a disability did not place the ballot paper in the box himself in 17.86% of cases.

³¹ The personal cards of voters were not scrutinized at several centres, and those cards not bearing an electoral district were permitted to vote after five o'clock, such as at the King Abdullah School of Excellence polling centre in the First District in Zarqa Governorate.

- p. The National Team also monitored attempts to influence the choices of voters at 2.67% of the centres monitored — as occurred at the Al-Walid bin Abd Al-Malik Secondary School for Boys polling centre and the Bayt Ras Comprehensive Secondary School for Girls in the First District in Irbid Governorate and at the Mursa' Secondary School for Girls in Jerash Governorate — in addition to attempts at intimidation and violence to prevent voters from casting their votes and to influence their freedom to choose their candidate, on the part of certain candidates and their supporters in a number of governorates. A number of them were arrested in certain governorates by the security agencies, as occurred at the Iskan Tayba School polling centre in the First District in Balqa Governorate and at the Western Dhuhayba Secondary School for Boys in the Central Badia district.
- q. Among the regrettable matters was the occurrence of repeated acts of violence in a number of governorates on election day, of which the National Team monitored the following:
1. One of the candidates in the Fourth District in the Capital was subjected to an attempted running-over by supporters of another candidate, resulting in bruising described as slight.
 2. The Sakib area in Jerash Governorate witnessed acts of rioting as a result of affrays occurring between the supporters of candidates, which led the chairperson of the committees at one of the polling centres to close the ballot boxes.
 3. The village of Imra' in Karak Governorate witnessed acts of violence resulting in the death of one citizen and three injuries, one of which affected a candidate who was transferred to one of the hospitals of the Capital — which led to the intervention of the Gendarmerie Forces, the securing of order, the impounding of the ballot boxes and the suspension of the voting operation before the expiry of the statutory period.
 4. The Manshiyyat Al-Qudah School within the Central Badia district witnessed acts of violence by the supporters of certain candidates, which led to the closure of the polling centre before the expiry of the statutory period.
 5. A group of supporters of one of the candidates attempted to enter the Manshiyyat Al-Qudah Comprehensive Secondary School for Girls polling centre in the Central Badia district in order to place forged papers in the ballot boxes, and fired shots at the security forces present at the polling centre. The Public Security forces confronted them and prevented them from entering, and the ballot boxes were closed by the committee before the expiry of the statutory period for closing the boxes (6:26 p.m.).
 6. Shots were fired by supporters of one of the candidates in the courtyard of the Khadija bint Khuwaylid Secondary School for Girls in the Fourth District in the Capital.
 7. The Governorates of Ajloun, Mafrq and Irbid witnessed tribal skirmishes aimed at preventing members of certain tribes from casting their votes.
- r. Certain citizens complained of the opening of the doors of the Civil Status Department in the city of Ajloun during polling day, with individuals among the supporters of one of the candidates entering the Department; it was not possible to ascertain what took place inside the Department.

- s. The Centre received a complaint concerning the prevention by a member of the Public Security of two delegates of one of the daily newspapers from entering one of the polling and counting centres in the Capital, notwithstanding that they carried permits authorizing them to enter all centres.

3. The procedures specific to the closing of the ballot boxes

The National Team monitored the procedures for closing the ballot boxes at the centres monitored. Approximately 99.44% of the members of the Team were permitted by the chairpersons of the polling and counting committees to follow these procedures, and the Team was able to record the following observations:

- a. The doors of the polling centres were closed by seven o'clock in the evening at approximately 98.02% of them, voters being present at 8% of these centres; many of them were unable to exercise their right to vote, as occurred at the Al-Iskan Mixed Basic School for Girls polling centre in the First District in Ma'an Governorate, the Ras Munif Secondary School for Girls polling centre in Ajloun Governorate, the Al-Qadisiyya Comprehensive Secondary School for Girls polling centre in the Second District in Tafilah Governorate, and the Ashrafiyya Comprehensive Secondary School for Girls polling centre in the Second District in the Capital.
- b. The presence of persons who were not members of the polling and box-counting committee, nor candidates or their delegates, nor observers, at 25.34% of the boxes whose closing procedures were monitored. These were most probably from the security agencies — a matter contrary to Article 38 of the Elections Law, which entrusted to the polling and counting committee the responsibility for closing the boxes and drawing up the record relating thereto, without the intervention of persons from outside the committee.
- c. The polling and counting committees monitored prepared the record of the conclusion of polling at 99.04% of the centres monitored; the Team monitored, however, the failure of certain chairpersons of polling committees to count and record the number of ballot papers at 4.48% of the total boxes monitored, and 2.04% of the committees did not permit those attending to sign the record, as occurred at the Al-Mazar Comprehensive Secondary School for Girls polling centres in the Third District in Irbid Governorate — which constitutes a breach of Article 38 of the Elections Law, which required the polling and counting committee to draw up a record containing the number of voters who had exercised the right to vote at the box and the number of papers used in polling and those not used or cancelled or destroyed, and the reason therefor.
- d. Approximately 95% of the observers indicated the correspondence of the number of ballot papers used with the number of voters registered in the special roll prepared by the polling and counting committee, while 5% of them indicated the absence of correspondence.
- e. The observers of the National Team noted delay in the arrival of certain ballot boxes and of their records at the final aggregation centre in the First District – Balqa Governorate by more than two hours, owing to the objection of the supporters of one candidate to another candidate obtaining a high number of votes during the count, on the pretext that he had no supporters in that area. The supporters of that

candidate also closed the road and burned tyres, which led to the intervention of the security forces and the firing of tear gas at those present in the area of the counting centre.

- f. Among the striking matters is the report published by the newspaper Al-Arab Al-Yawm on 14/11/2010, which disclosed a considerable contradiction in the figures issued by the Ministry of the Interior on the basis of two tables announced by the Ministry. While the number of voters in all districts of the Capital Amman, save for the Central Badia, ten minutes before the closing of the boxes amounted to (267,815) male and female voters, this figure fell to (260,823), a difference of (6,992). This was repeated in Balqa Governorate as well, where the number of voters in all districts of Balqa Governorate rose from (121,652) voters ten minutes before the closing of the boxes to (130,245) voters, a difference of (8,593). This was repeated with all the other governorates — a matter that raises questions as to the increase, which appears illogical and unacceptable on the one hand, and as to whether the differences are attributable to differences in the number of votes and the total of cancelled papers on the other. The Ministry of the Interior, however, did not comment upon the report published in the newspaper and did not announce, in any of its results or official statements, the number of papers cancelled in the counting operations.³²

4. The procedures specific to the vote counting operation

The National Team monitored the vote counting procedures at the polling centres allocated to it at approximately 99.71% of the centres monitored, and was able to record the following observations:

- a. The observers indicated that the operation of opening the box and counting the papers contained in it took place in the presence of the candidates or their delegates. The Team observed, however, the presence of persons who were not members of the polling and counting committees during the reading out of the names at 26.04% of the centres monitored³³ — a matter constituting a breach of Article 39 of the Elections Law, which entrusts the task of opening the boxes and carrying out the counting operation to the members of the committees alone.
- b. Approximately 99% of the observers indicated that the box was emptied completely in the presence of those attending. In addition, the number of ballot papers present in the boxes was counted before commencing the count at a rate of 95.17% of the centres monitored, as occurred at the Abu Alia Secondary School for Girls polling centre in the First District in the Capital.
- c. The observers indicated that the chairperson of the committee or one of its members read out the names entered on the ballot paper clearly and deliberately within the hearing of those attending at 97.47% of the centres monitored; that the board designated for recording the votes obtained by each candidate was visible to those attending and enabled them to follow the marking upon it at 98.83% of the centres

³² The National Team recorded the referral by the Government of three persons in the Capital and five persons in the Northern Region to the judiciary after they were apprehended in operations of selling and buying votes and withholding personal cards for the purposes of the parliamentary elections; the Team was unable to ascertain the outcome of the judicial measures taken against them.

³³ Voting was suspended from ten o'clock and five minutes until ten o'clock and thirty-five minutes at the Jabal Nuzha School for Boys in the Fifth District in Irbid Governorate. Voting was likewise suspended for a period of 10 minutes at the Umm Al-Hakam Mixed Basic School polling centre in the First District in Ma'an.

monitored; and that the remaining members of the committee followed the reading and recording operation accurately at 98.51% of the centres monitored.

- d. The Team monitored the reading out of ballot papers otherwise than in accordance with their content in 312 cases; objection was made by those attending in 285 of these cases, and the committee responded to approximately 58% of the objections and determined them immediately. Objections and decisions were entered in writing by the committee at a rate of 46.01% of the centres — which discloses the extent of the need to regulate the operation of reading out the papers in a manner guaranteeing the transparency and integrity of the committee in this field, such as by passing the paper to the candidates' delegates and the observers, or by displaying it on a device showing the name of the candidate entered on the paper.
- e. A total of 80.81% of the observers indicated that there had been cancellation of ballot papers during the counting operation, amounting to 8,956 papers, of which 1,315 papers were unstamped, 1,329 papers were unsigned, 985 papers were unsigned and unstamped, 772 papers contained, in addition to the name of the candidate, expressions and additions indicating the name of the voter, 825 papers were cancelled owing to the inability to read the name of the candidate, 1,007 papers contained more than one candidate's name, and 2,723 for other reasons — such as the cancellation of 35 papers as being forged and from outside the hall, and the cancellation of 4 papers for non-correspondence of signatures at the Rajm Al-Shami Al-Gharbi School for Boys polling centre in the Central Badia. This discloses, particularly as regards the first three grounds, the failure of the polling committees to carry out their work accurately on some occasions, indicating the infiltration of a defect into the integrity of the polling operation.
- f. A total of 94 observers indicated the non-correspondence of the number of persons who actually voted with the total number of votes obtained by all candidates in 30 electoral districts, including the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Districts in Irbid Governorate, all districts of the Capital, Zarqa and Madaba Governorates, and the Central Badia district. The Team also recorded the existence of cases of non-correspondence between the number of papers cancelled and not counted and the number of persons who actually voted at approximately 15% of the centres monitored, according to the total number of votes obtained by all candidates at the counting centres monitored — it being noted that the monitoring team was unable to determine whether that correspondence constituted an excess or a shortfall over the 5% specified by the law, owing to the absence of records specific to each box showing the true number of persons voting at that box, and likewise the failure of the chairpersons of committees to furnish observers with the number of voters who had exercised their right to vote at those boxes, which prevents observers and delegates from monitoring the true difference and from verifying the correspondence of the ballot papers with the true number of voters. The Centre recommends the necessity of amending the Law so that the numbers and names of the voters at each box are determined, which would mean the possibility of the proper application of Article 39(e), which provides that the results of the polling at a box shall be treated as cancelled if it appears, after counting the number of papers in it, that they exceed or fall short by a proportion exceeding 5% of the number of persons voting at that box.

- g. The polling and counting committees at the centres monitored prepared the record of the conclusion of the counting operation at 97.74% of the centres — which means the compliance of the majority of the polling and counting committees with the Elections Law and the instructions of the Ministry of the Interior in this regard, although a small proportion of them did not do so. The result of the count was announced immediately upon the conclusion of the counting operation at 96.72% of the centres, and all electoral documents were delivered immediately to the sub-district committee at 96.84% of the centres. It should be noted that most of the polling and counting committees announced the preliminary results obtained by the candidates immediately upon the conclusion of the counting operation, notwithstanding that the law does not require this — a matter that requires the amendment of the Law and express provision for the necessity of announcing the results immediately upon the conclusion of the counting operation.
- h. The National Team monitored that one of the boxes in the Central Badia district contained 780 votes, which provoked one of the candidates, who objected to the number, pointing out that the total minutes of the polling period were 720 minutes — which means that the polling time for each voter was less than one minute, which is not possible.³⁴ It should be mentioned that the monitoring team in the Third District in Karak indicated that one of the boxes contained 2,124 ballot papers, which means that the polling rate at that box reaches three persons per minute — a matter that is not possible in practice.

5. The final vote aggregation operation and the announcement of the results

The National Team monitored the final aggregation procedures and the announcement of the results at approximately 92% of the final aggregation centres monitored, whereas the Team was unable to follow the aggregation operation at approximately 8% of them. The Team recorded the following observations:

- a. The Team indicated that at 97.22% of the electoral district committees monitored the votes obtained by each candidate at the various boxes belonging to the district were aggregated as soon as the results reached them, and that the aggregation operation took place in the presence of the candidates or their delegates and the observers in these districts at a rate of 97.30%. It was observed, however, that persons were present alongside the electoral district committees, the candidates or their delegates and the observers during the aggregation of the votes at 44.44% of the centres — a matter that raises doubts as to the true role of those persons and necessarily affects the integrity of the electoral process, and contravenes Article 40 of the Law, which entrusted to the electoral district committee the carrying out of the operation of aggregating the votes obtained by each candidate in the district.
- b. The National Team monitored the submission of two objections to the method of aggregation by the election committees in the Central Badia district, on account of one of the boxes containing a high proportion of the votes of voters for one of the candidates; and in the Northern Badia district, on account of the election committee aggregating the votes obtained by each candidate separately and not announcing these results immediately, on the pretext that they would announce the results of all candidates at once.

³⁴ For further detail see Al-Arab Al-Yawm.

- c. The final results of the elections were announced by the electoral district committees monitored immediately upon the conclusion of the aggregation of the votes in the presence of those attending at 91.18% of the centres monitored. Three observers in the Third and Fourth Districts in the Capital Governorate and in the Central Badia district, however, recorded the failure of the committees to announce the results immediately upon the conclusion of the aggregation operation — which constituted a manifest breach of Article 40 of the Elections Law and is inconsistent with the principle of transparency requiring the publication of the results immediately upon the conclusion of the vote aggregation operation. In addition, the electoral district committees in those three districts did not prepare a record containing the number of persons voting in each district.
- d. The observers of the National Team recorded the suspension of the operation of the final aggregation of the candidates' votes at the final aggregation centre for the Central Badia, owing to objections by candidates and their delegates on the pretext of the existence of manipulation in favour of one of the competing candidates before the conclusion of the counting operation; the Centre was unable to verify the vote aggregation operation and the announcement of the success of the candidates at that centre.
- e. The polling percentage and the vote aggregation operation from which the final results emerged were not subject to audit, and the results of the figures issued by each polling centre were not announced in a manner enabling candidates and observers to verify their credibility, in that those attending at all the centres were not shown the records drawn up by each polling and counting committee. This took place in a private room to which no one was permitted access to see what was taking place in it, after which a paper would be produced setting out the number of votes obtained by each candidate, aggregation being carried out on the basis of these figures. Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior delayed in announcing the results obtained by the candidates who had been unsuccessful in the elections, and initially refused to announce these results on the pretext that they cause embarrassment to certain candidates. The Centre received a complaint from one of the female candidates in the First District in Madaba Governorate concerning her failure to obtain any vote at the box in which she and her family had cast their votes.

Annex No. (1)

The letter of His Excellency the Prime Minister permitting the National Centre to follow and observe the electoral process

[Reproduction in the Arabic original of a facsimile of the letter of His Excellency the Prime Minister addressed to His Excellency the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, dated 22 Jumada al-Akhirah 1431 AH corresponding to 6/6/2010, which reads in substance:]

“I enclose for Your Excellency a copy of the letter of His Excellency the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Centre for Human Rights No. H/1/554/Elections dated 22/1/2010 concerning the forthcoming parliamentary elections. ... I decide to permit the National Centre for Human Rights to follow and observe the electoral procedures adopted during the electoral polling day, including entry to the polling and counting centres. Please accept my highest regards.”

Signed: The Prime Minister, Samir Al-Rifai. Copies: His Excellency the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Centre for Human Rights; the Adviser for Internal Affairs.

Annex No. (2)

Tables of the distribution of observers on polling and counting day among the electoral districts

The Northern Governorates

District	No. of ballot boxes	No. of observers
First: Irbid Governorate		
First District	288	87
Second District	76	23
Third District	34	10
Fourth District	67	20
Fifth District	70	21
Sixth District	74	22
Seventh District	64	19
Eighth District	28	9
Ninth District	24	8
Total	725	219
Second: Jerash Governorate	134	40
Third: Ajloun Governorate		
First District	96	29
Second District	24	7
Total	120	36
Fourth: Mafraq Governorate	98	30
Fifth: Northern Badia	117	35
Total	1194	360

The Central Governorates

District	No. of ballot boxes	No. of observers
First: The Capital Governorate		
First District	260	78
Second District	293	88
Third District	240	72
Fourth District	180	55
Fifth District	201	61
Sixth District	130	39
Seventh District	53	16
Total	1357	409
Second: Balqa Governorate		

District	No. of ballot boxes	No. of observers
First District	134	41
Second District	24	7
Third District	49	15
Fourth District	60	18
Total	267	81
Third: Zarqa Governorate		
First District	194	58
Second District	84	25
Third District	34	10
Fourth District	136	42
Total	448	135
Fourth: Madaba Governorate		
First District	72	22
Second District	35	10
Total	107	32
Central Badia	103	31
Total	2282	688

The Southern Governorates

District	No. of ballot boxes	No. of observers
First: Karak Governorate		
First District	74	22
Second District	34	11
Third District	59	18
Fourth District	28	8
Fifth District	20	6
Sixth District	13	4
Total	228	96
Second: Ma'an Governorate		
First District	27	8
Second District	14	4
Third District	20	6
Total	61	18
Third: Tafilah Governorate		
First District	54	16
Second District	18	6
Total	72	22

District	No. of ballot boxes	No. of observers
Fourth: Aqaba Governorate	46	14

Annex No. (3)

Plan for following up the voter registration centres

In order to facilitate the process of monitoring voter registration and to organize communication between the Centre and the observers, the following steps were followed:

First: Upon the conclusion of the observers' training process, they sign the code of conduct annexed to this plan, which is regarded as a document of honour under which the monitor undertakes to perform the tasks entrusted to him or her.

Second: The observers receive the monitoring forms from the National Centre for Human Rights.

Third: The National Centre for Human Rights furnishes the observers with the address of the registration centre situated in their electoral district and with the telephone and fax numbers and email addresses of the centre and of the observers themselves.

Fourth: Each monitor is furnished with a letter establishing that he is one of the observers of the National Centre for Human Rights, together with a copy of the letter of His Excellency the Prime Minister containing the approval for the Centre to monitor the conduct of the electoral process.

Fifth: The observer of each electoral district prepares a monitoring timetable consistent with their daily obligations (such as work and otherwise) and furnishes the National Centre for Human Rights with this programme, which is required to contribute to the achievement of the following:

- Presence at the registration centre three times daily, distributed at varying intervals, provided that the number of hours of presence is not less than one hour on each occasion.
- Completion of the form designated for monitoring voter registration daily, at the rate of three forms per day.

Sixth: The observer furnishes the National Centre for Human Rights with the monitoring forms on a weekly basis, that is at the end of working hours on Thursday of each week, by delivering them by hand or sending them by fax or by email.

Seventh: In the event of any violations occurring, the National Centre for Human Rights is informed thereof directly by telephone in order that the Centre may follow them up with the entities concerned.

Annex No. (4)

Work plan during polling day

In order to facilitate the process of monitoring the procedures of polling day and to organize communication between the Centre and the observers, the following steps were followed:

1. The district coordinators furnish the observers with the names of the polling centres to be monitored and the number of the ballot box allocated to each of them and its address, in accordance with the plan prepared by the Centre.
2. The observer must ensure that all monitoring forms are in his file, and must work to complete them with great accuracy and retain them for delivery to the district coordinator on the morning of the day following polling day.
3. Each observer undertakes the task of monitoring one ballot box only throughout polling day from the hour of opening (six o'clock in the morning until the conclusion of the preliminary count).
4. Each observer must visit the location of the ballot box allocated to him before polling day in order to identify its whereabouts.
5. The observer must bring his mobile device carrying the number he has furnished to the district coordinator and to the National Centre for Human Rights, and must ensure that it is charged throughout the preceding night; it is preferable that the observer carry his charger with him as a precaution. In the event of a change of telephone number before polling day, the regional coordinator and the governorate and district coordinators must be furnished with the new number.
6. The observer must switch off his mobile device before entering the room in which the ballot box is located and must not switch it on throughout his presence in the room. In order to send messages or make calls concerning any violations, the observer must leave the room, make the necessary contact, then switch off the mobile device and return to his place.
7. The observer is to be present in front of the polling centre in which the ballot box allocated to him is located at precisely six o'clock in the morning in order to monitor the procedures for opening the ballot box.
8. During the procedures for opening the ballot box the observer completes the form designated for this stage, namely Form No. (1).
9. Upon completing the form, and at precisely a quarter past seven in the morning, the observer proceeds to the door of the room in which the box is located and sends an SMS message to the numbers with which he will be furnished containing the answers to all the questions set out in the form specific to the procedures for opening the box. The observer then switches off his mobile device and returns to the room in which the ballot box is located.
10. The observer then begins to complete the first copy of Form No. (2) specific to the procedures of polling day and the first copy of Form No. (3) specific to voting by those unable to read or write or

by illiterate voters, and furnishes the Centre with the answers by SMS at precisely twelve o'clock noon in the same manner set out above.

11. The observer then begins to complete the second copy of Form No. (2) specific to the procedures of polling day and the second copy of Form No. (3) specific to voting by those unable to read or write or by illiterate voters, and furnishes the Centre with the answers by SMS at precisely five o'clock in the evening in the same manner set out above.
12. Thereafter the observer remains alert to any violations that may occur during polling day and resorts to completing the form specific to significant incidents and sending short messages to the Centre, or contacting the district or governorate coordinator or the Centre, in order to report any events he considers it necessary to report. The observer may also use this form at any time throughout polling day should the need arise.
13. The observer then begins to complete Form No. (4) specific to the procedures for the conclusion of polling and the closing of the ballot box, and upon completing it sends the answers by short message to the Centre immediately upon the conclusion of the closing procedures, in accordance with what has been set out above concerning the use of the mobile telephone.
14. The observer remains present in the ballot box room in order to monitor the vote counting operation and works to complete the form specific to this stage (Form No. 5), and upon completing it works to complete Form No. (6) specific to the names of the candidates and the votes obtained by each candidate at the box, then sends the answers to the fifth and sixth forms to the Centre by short messages immediately upon the conclusion of the counting operation and the collection of the ballot papers at the box.
15. During polling day the coordinators verify the presence of the observers at the places allocated to them and their performance of the tasks entrusted to them and their completion of the forms and their transmission to the Centre at the times specified therefor. All coordinators keep their mobile telephones switched on throughout polling day and maintain continuous communication between the Centre and the field observers.
16. The coordinators proceed to the counting and main vote aggregation rooms, each in his district, and work to monitor this stage and to complete the form specific thereto (Form No. 7), and to complete the form specific to the results of the number of votes, then send the results to the Centre immediately upon the conclusion of this stage. The coordinators may seek the assistance of observers to take turns in monitoring the final aggregation operation.

Annex No. (5)

Code of conduct of the coordinator

The National Centre for Human Rights is an independent national institution established under Law No. 51 of 2006, which aims to protect and promote the human rights guaranteed under the international covenants and conventions, to monitor their situation and to observe and document any violations occurring against these rights, and to cooperate with the various governmental and non-governmental institutions with a view to halting them and limiting their effects — in addition to promoting the democratic approach in the Kingdom so as to create an integrated and balanced model founded upon the diffusion of freedoms, the guarantee of political pluralism, respect for the rule of law, and the guarantee of the right to economic, social and cultural development.

Since free, honest and fair elections are regarded as one of the fundamental rights of the peoples of all States, being the free expression that is regarded as one of the pillars of authority and confers legitimacy upon it, the monitoring of the conduct of the electoral process at all its stages and the observation and documentation of the violations accompanying the elections fall within the mandate and powers of the National Centre for Human Rights provided for in its Law.

Through monitoring the various stages of the electoral process, the National Centre for Human Rights aims to achieve the following objectives:

1. Encouraging participation in the elections and building confidence in the electoral process by affirming the fairness, integrity and transparency of the elections.
2. Assessing all stages of the electoral process, beginning with the voter registration process, the registration of candidates, the electoral campaigns, polling day, and the counting and announcement of the results, and ending with appeals and objections.

In furtherance of the foregoing objectives, and in order to entrench pluralism and the participation of civil society institutions in the organization and preparation of the various stages of the electoral process, support teams were formed comprising coordinators representing these institutions and working in continuous and direct coordination with the project management team formed by the National Centre for Human Rights. This code of conduct was developed so as to constitute a charter of honour to be observed by the coordinators.

The code of conduct comprises the following rules:

1. Respect for and full compliance with the Jordanian Constitution, laws and regulations.
2. Maintaining complete neutrality and refraining from bias towards any party or candidate, and refraining from any conduct indicating favouritism or preference, or from distributing leaflets or participating in campaign activities or electoral campaigning for any party or candidate.
3. Attendance at the training designated for coordinators to be conducted by the National Centre for Human Rights.

4. Following up the process of registering voters and candidates and the electoral campaigns.
5. Direct and continuous coordination with the project management team at the National Centre for Human Rights.
6. Selecting the members of the team in the governorates in accordance with the criteria agreed with the project management team.
7. Furnishing the National Centre for Human Rights with the names and addresses of the members of the team and the bodies they represent.
8. Training the members of the team in accordance with the timetable agreed with the project management team.
9. Contributing to the identification of the polling centres to be followed up and laying down a plan for the distribution of the members of the team among these centres.
10. Furnishing the members of the team with all requirements before polling day (forms, addresses of the polling and counting places, and any instructions agreed with the project management team).
11. Ensuring channels of communication between the operations room at the Centre and the members of the team during polling day.
12. Verifying the presence of the members of the team at the centres identified, furnishing them with any requirements during polling day, and preserving their safety and security.
13. Receiving forms from the members of the team and furnishing the Centre with a summary thereof in accordance with the timetable to be laid down for this purpose.
14. Delivering all forms to the project management team on the day following polling day.
15. Supervising the process of delivering the financial allowances to the members of the team and delivering all documents (signed receipts) evidencing this to the project management team.
16. Refraining from making any statements to the media before, during or after polling day.
17. Keeping away from and not intervening in any acts of rioting or violence occurring at the polling centre, and informing the National Centre for Human Rights directly, or the electoral district coordinator, of these events as quickly as possible.
18. Refraining from carrying weapons of any kind.

Annex No. (6)

Code of conduct of the observer

The National Centre for Human Rights is an independent national institution established under Law No. 51 of 2006, which aims to protect and promote the human rights guaranteed under the international covenants and conventions, to monitor their situation and to observe and document any violations occurring against these rights, and to cooperate with the various governmental and non-governmental institutions with a view to halting them and limiting their effects — in addition to promoting the democratic approach in the Kingdom so as to create an integrated and balanced model founded upon the diffusion of freedoms, the guarantee of political pluralism, respect for the rule of law, and the guarantee of the right to economic, social and cultural development.

Since free, honest and fair elections are regarded as one of the fundamental rights of the peoples of all States, being the free expression that is regarded as one of the pillars of authority and confers legitimacy upon it, the monitoring of the conduct of the electoral process at all its stages and the observation and documentation of the violations accompanying the elections fall within the mandate and powers of the National Centre for Human Rights provided for in its Law.

Through monitoring the various stages of the electoral process, the National Centre for Human Rights aims to achieve the following objectives:

1. Encouraging participation in the elections and building confidence in the electoral process by affirming the fairness, integrity and transparency of the elections.
2. Assessing all stages of the electoral process, beginning with the voter registration process, the registration of candidates, the electoral campaigns, polling day, and the counting and announcement of the results, and ending with appeals and objections.

In order to guarantee the integrity of the electoral process and to give effect to the two principles of independence and neutrality, this code of conduct was developed so as to constitute a charter of honour to be observed by all members of the team.

The code comprises the rules that the observer must observe at all stages of the electoral process:

1. Respect for and full compliance with the Jordanian Constitution, laws and regulations.
2. Maintaining complete neutrality and refraining from bias towards any party or candidate, and refraining from any conduct indicating favouritism or preference, such as distributing leaflets or participating in campaign activities or electoral campaigning for any party or candidate, or any other act capable of being interpreted as bias.
3. Compliance with the guidance of the National Centre for Human Rights and of the governorate coordinators and the electoral district coordinators concerning the electoral process.

4. The observer working within the team of the National Centre for Human Rights undertakes to work exclusively for the benefit of this team and not to disclose any information or data obtained to any other body.
5. All information and data resulting from the electoral process are the property of the National Centre for Human Rights alone, which has the full right to dispose of them in a manner achieving the aims and objectives of the project.
6. Displaying clearly the observer's card authorizing him to enter the registration, polling or counting centres, and informing the National Centre for Human Rights directly, or the electoral district coordinator, in cases of prevention from entry, without arguing with security personnel, public officials or the members of the committee supervising the registration, polling or counting centres.
7. Completing the forms accurately and recording any observations that serve the process, and delivering all forms to the National Centre for Human Rights or to the electoral district coordinator at the time specified therefor.
8. Refraining from making any statements to the media before, during or after the process.
9. Keeping away from and not intervening in any gathering or acts of rioting or violence occurring at the registration, polling or counting centre, and informing the National Centre for Human Rights directly and the electoral district coordinator and the governorate coordinator of these events as quickly as possible.
10. Refraining from carrying weapons or sharp instruments of any kind.
11. Presence at the designated registration, polling or counting centre at the times specified by the Centre, and not leaving it save with the knowledge of the electoral district coordinator and the governorate coordinator.
12. Refraining from intervening in the decisions of the official committees (registration, polling, counting) relating to the procedures of the electoral process.
13. Signing the form of undertaking and declaration to work as an observer of the electoral process under the supervision of the National Centre for Human Rights.

Annexes Nos. (7) to (10)

The Arabic original contains four further annexes, comprising:

Annex No. (7): Monitoring forms for the stage preceding polling day (nine forms), the first of which is the form for monitoring voter registration at the civil status offices, comprising a first axis (general information) and a second axis (information concerning the registration centre).

Annex No. (8): The forms specific to polling day (the forms for monitoring the opening of the ballot box and the commencement of polling; the polling procedures; the procedures for voting by those unable to read or write; the procedures for the conclusion of polling and the closing of the ballot boxes; the counting operation at the box; the results of the count of candidates at the ballot box; and the final aggregation form).

Annex No. (9): The table of registration centres monitored by the National Team.

Annex No. (10): The difference between the numbers of voters in the paper rolls and in the electronic rolls.